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CP text: The United States Federal government should ratify the Inter-American Convention Against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Ammunition, Explosives, and other Related Materials.

CP solves for US and OAS credibility

FAS 13 (Federation of American Scientists, “OAS Firearms Convention”, http://www.fas.org/programs/ssp/asmp/issueareas/oas.html, 2013)//SLR

The United States and the Convention: While the United States was among the first countries to sign the Convention, it is now one of only a handful of other countries that still have not ratified it. Ratification would boost the credibility of the Convention and U.S. exhortations to comply with its provisions. It would require no new laws, and any modifications to US regulations and policies needed to comply with the Convention would be minimal. Even though U.S. laws are already largely in compliance with the provisions of the Convention, ratification by the United States is important for several reasons: Failure to ratify reduces U.S. credibility in OAS Meetings. By not ratifying the Convention, the U.S. has relegated itself to observer status at meetings of the Convention's Consultative Committee. While observer states are permitted to attend meetings and make statements, their status detracts from the persuasive power of their statements and recommendations; representatives of full States Parties to the Convention have expressed annoyance with observers that make strong recommendations at Consultative Committee meetings. Failure to ratify undermines U.S. efforts to compel other states to implement the Convention's many important provisions. As revealed by a recent OAS survey of compliance with the Convention, several member states have yet to implement many of the Convention's key provisions. U.S. exhortations to comply with the Convention ring hollow when the U.S. itself has not ratified it. Ratification would boost the credibility of the Convention. Officials from member states and the OAS General Secretariat emphasize the importance of U.S. ratification, claiming that it would provide an immediate boost to the Convention's credibility. Conversely, continued failure on the part of the United States to ratify the convention would damage its prestige over time. Ratification would help to reduce resentment generated by our refusal to adopt other popular international agreements. This resentment has a direct impact on the pursuit of U.S. foreign policy objectives. For example, the international community took the unprecedented step of voting the U.S. off the UN Human Rights Commission in May 2001 in part because of U.S. rejection of the Kyoto Protocol and the International Criminal Court Statute. Ratification of the OAS Convention would send a strong signal to the international community that the United States does in fact recognize the value of, and need for, international cooperation on terrorism and other important issues.

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The United States federal government should request the governments of Brazil and Mexico engage in dialogue with Cuba on its behalf as per Iglesias. The United States federal government should implement any resulting policy recommendations made by Brazil and Mexico following the dialogue toward Cuba.

Solves the case and avoids politics

Iglesias, Commander in the U.S. Navy, 2012

[Carlos, United States Navy Commander, “United States Security Policy Implications of a Post-Fidel Cuba,” manuscript submitted in partial fulfillment of the Masters of Strategic Studies Degree at the US Army War College, United States Army War College Strategy Research Project, <http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA560408~~>] Idriss

Unlike the policy implications above, the major hurdle to this interest does not come from any continuation of the GOC, but from the rest of the world. International opposition to the perceived fairness and effectiveness of the economic sanctions has long posed an obstacle for U.S. policy. In the global scale, the problem is epitomized by the twenty consecutive years of near unanimous UN General Assembly resolution votes against the embargo. 96 More regionally, Spain and other European Union partners have strongly pushed to loosen sanctions. The arguments are straightforward and pragmatic, “since sanctions in place have not worked, it makes more sense to do things that would work, and (the next obvious one is to) change things.”97 Even more locally, Cuba has managed to generally retain positive feelings among the people of Latin American in spite of the country’s domestic realities.98 The rise of Raúl and any subsequent successions further complicated the problem of mustering international consensus. Several countries in the hemisphere see any new Cuban leadership as fresh opportunities to engage in common interests. The two largest Latin American countries, Brazil and Mexico, have both ascribed to this approach and have indicated their interests in forging new ties since Fidel’s stepped down.99 On the other hand, this international dissention does hold some prospect for leveraging U.S. soft power. An indirect approach would be to coordinate U.S. proxy actions with partner countries interested in Cuba. This has the double benefit of leveraging U.S. soft power without compromising legislated restrictions or provoking hard-line Cuban-American ire. In this approach, burgeoning relations with Brazil and Mexico would be strong candidates. Devoid of the “bullhorn diplomacy” that have marginalized U.S.-Cuban policy efficacy for decades, the U.S. could better engage the island through hemispherical interlocutors. At a minimum, U.S. interests would be advanced through the proxy insights of what is occurring on the island in addition to the potential displacement of anti-American influences (e.g. Chávez).100

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CIR will pass now – history proves

Wilkinson 11/1/13 – (Francis Wilkinson is a member of the Bloomberg View editorial board. http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-11-01/republicans-will-pass-immigration-reform-soon-.html)

While some contend that the advent of an election year dooms immigration reform, history suggests otherwise. Many immigration bills have passed in even years, including the comprehensive reform of 1986, which the current Senate bill (slightly modified and embraced by House Democrats) resembles in its political balance between enforcement and legalization of undocumented immigrants. Other immigration legislation passed Congress in 1996, 1990, 1980, 1976 and 1952.

Immigration laws don't invite smooth sailing. "The '86 bill was dead so many times," recalled Muzaffar Chishti, who runs the New York office of the Migration Policy Institute. "I took my vacation after it was clear Congress was not going to pass a bill." Chishti was not the only one surprised when a major overhaul passed both houses in mid-October, just weeks before the 1986 midterm election.

The 2014 election promises to be nationalized, both because national partisanship increasingly pervades districts far from Washington and because the party arguments now taking shape -- basically "they're lunatics" vs. "socialism sucks" -- are national in character. By late spring, when the Tea Party primary season has passed, Republicans may want to take another look at immigration. Then again, because it's hard, they may not. And because the 2014 race will lack the unifying force field provided by a presidential contest, when the whole party is on the ballot, they won't necessarily have to.

Changing Cuba policy requires a huge investment of capital

Birns & Strain 10 - Larry Birns, Director of the Council on Hemispheric Affairs, and Kelsey Strain, Research Associate at the COHA, November 18, 2010, "The Mid-Term Elections: An Easy Prediction for the Future of U.S.-Cuba Relations," online: http://www.coha.org/the-mid-term-elections-an-easy-prediction-for-the-future-of-u-s-cuba-relations/

As former U.S. Ambassador to Cuba, Wayne Smith, explains, “There is a small minority blocking the sensible will of the majority.” Despite such a forceful push for reform across the globe, Washington has repeatedly failed to show a willingness to alter its Cuban policy. A misreading of the conciliatory attitude from Miami’s Cuban community has kept timorous Washington politicians from daring to think boldly when it comes to Cuba. In spite of a new congressional make-up and a desk filled with challenges coming from around the world, President Obama’s commitment to “new relations” with the island should be seen through. Given the new environment in which he will be working, a normalization of U.S.-Cuban relations will only happen if Obama makes it a primary objective, should he decide that it is worth the political investment.

mmigration reform key to increase high skilled workers:

Esther Yu-Hsi Lee, 10/16/2013 (staff writer, “Class Divide Widens Between Low-Wage And High-Wage Workers In Silicon Valley,” <http://thinkprogress.org/immigration/2013/10/16/2779601/wage-immigrants-silicon-valley/>, Accessed 10/17/2013, rwg)

Faced with a growing need for high-skilled foreign workers, Silicon Valley has taken a pointed interest in immigration reform in the past year, as is made clear by FWD.us, Facebook founder Mark Zuckerberg’s advocacy group lobbying for comprehensive immigration reform. Zuckerberg has emphasized that high-skilled immigration reform is no different than low-skilled immigration reform. Yet as the tech industry pushes for a more diverse workforce, a worsening class divide is pushing the area’s low-wage immigrants out of their homes and marginalizing them in the immigration debate.¶ As NPR reports this week, less than 7 miles from the Facebook headquarters lies a 4.5 acre mobile home park that is valued at $30 million by Silicon Valley real estate developers. Soon, the 400 mobile home park residents, about 80 percent of whom are Latino, may be squeezed out of the increasingly ritzy area, which has some of the most expensive homes in the country. The median household income is $101,471. In comparison, a two-bedroom, two-bath trailer home costs about $79,000.¶ Children living in the mobile home park would also be forced out of the sixth best school district out of 1,000 California public schools. Latino students in Palo Alto have a 52 point gain on standardized test scores over other Latinos statewide.¶ Some Palo Alto parents want the mobile home park to stay. Nancy Krop, a civil rights attorney said to National Public Radio, “I want every child to have the opportunity that my son’s going to have… My son has gone on play dates to homes where he found out his friend didn’t have a bedroom… You learn what they don’t have; you learn the richness of what they do have too — the strength of their community and culture and heritage.”¶ Silicon Valley companies have mainly focused on immigration reform for highly educated foreign workers. Technology companies spent about $13.8 million in just three months to ensure that the Senate immigration bill would expand temporary visas and green cards for technology workers. The industry successfully influencing senators to nearly double its allotment of high-skilled, H-1B visas from 65,000 to 110,000 in the Senate immigration bill.

Skilled worker access will determine the future of the biotech industry

Dahms 3, executive director of the California State University System Biotechnology Program (CSUPERB); chair of the Workforce Committee, Biotechnology Industry Organization; and a member of the ASBMB Education and Professional Development Committee, (A. Stephen, “ Foreign Scientists Seen Essential to U.S. Biotechnology,” in Pan-Organizational Summit on the U.S. Science and Engineering Workforce: Meeting Summary, National Academy of Sciences, <http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/bookshelf/picrender.fcgi?book=nap10727&blobtype=pdf>)

The scarcity of skilled technicians is seen by the biotechnology industry in the U.S. and Canada as one of its most serious challenges. The success of this industry is dependent on the quality of its workforce, and the skills and talents of highly trained people are recognized as one of the most vital and dynamic sources of competitive advantage. The U.S. biotechnology industry workforce has been growing 14 to 17 percent annually over the last six years and is now over 190,000 and conservatively estimated to reach 500,000 by 2012. Despite efforts by the industry to encourage U.S. institutions to increase the production of needed specialists, a continual shortfall in the needed expertise requires access to foreign workers. Foreign workers with unique skills that are scarce in the U.S. can get permission to stay in the U.S. for up to six years under the H1B classification, after which they can apply for permanent resident status. There are currently over 600,000 foreign workers in this category across all industries, and they are critical to the success and global competitiveness of this nation. Of these H-1B visa holders, 46 percent are from India and 10 percent are from China, followed in descending order by Canada, Philippines, Taiwan, Korea, Japan, U.K., Pakistan, and the Russian Federation. Our annual national surveys have demonstrated that between 6 and 10 percent of the biotechnology workforce have H-1B visas. The constant shortfall in specialized technical workers that has been experienced by the biotechnology industry over the past six years has been partially alleviated by access to talented individuals from other nations. However, the industry’s need is sufficient to justify a 25 percent increase in H-1Bs in 2004. Biotechnology industry H-1B visa holders are mainly in highly sought after areas such as analytical chemistry, instrumentation specialization, organic synthesis, product safety and surveillance, clinical research/biostatistics, bio/pharm quality, medicinal chemistry, product scale-up, bioinformatics and applied genomics, computer science, cheminformatics, pharmacokinetics, and pharmacodynamics. Forty percent of H-1B foreign workers are at the Ph.D. level, 35 percent M.S., 20 percent B.S., and 5 percent M.D. In comparison, the U.S. biotechnology industry technical workforce is estimated to be 19 percent Ph.D., 17 percent M.S., 50 percent B.S., and 14 percent combined voc-ed/ community college trained. These and other survey data by industry human resource groups clearly show that the H-1B worker skills match the most pressing employment needs of the biotechnology industry. The data demonstrate that maintaining a reasonably-sized H-1B cap is critical to the industry. Although the national annual H-1B visa cap was raised from 115,000 to 195,000 in the 106th Congress via S. 2045, the cap has already been exceeded. The increased cap remains in effect until 2003 and efforts are under way to ensure that it remains high. The Third Annual National Survey of H-1Bs in the biotechnology industry found that 80 percent are from U.S. universities, and 85 percent of those eventually get green cards. Companies now spend, on average, $10,200 in processing fees and legal expenses to obtain each green card, an estimated cost to the industry of more than $150 million over the past 5 years. In the wake of the 9/11 World Trade Center attacks, debate has been focused on more restrictions on foreign students, a development that would have a severe impact upon the competitiveness of the U.S. biotechnology industry. Clearly, the H-1B route provides a temporary solution to shortages in the national and domestic biotechnology labor pools, shortages mirroring the inadequate production of appropriately trained U.S. nationals by U.S. institutions of higher learning. The reality is that universities have inadequate resources for expanding the training pipeline, particularly in the specialized areas of the research phase of company product development. Efforts should be directed toward influencing greater congressional and federal agency attention to these important topics.

Solves bioterror

Bailey, 1 [Ronald, award-winning science correspondent for Reason magazine and Reason.com, where he writes a weekly science and technology column. Bailey is the author of the book Liberation Biology: The Moral and Scientific Case for the Biotech Revolution (Prometheus, 2005), and his work was featured in The Best American Science and Nature Writing 2004. In 2006, Bailey was shortlisted by the editors of Nature Biotechnology as one of the personalities who have made the "most significant contributions" to biotechnology in the last 10 years. 11/7/1, “The Best Biodefense,” Reason, <http://reason.com/archives/2001/11/07/the-best-biodefense>]

But Cipro and other antibiotics are just a small part of the arsenal that could one day soon be deployed in defending America against biowarfare. Just consider what’s in the pipeline now that could be used to protect Americans against infectious diseases, including bioterrorism. A Pharmaceutical Manufacturers and Research Association survey found 137 new medicines for infectious diseases in drug company research and development pipelines, including 19 antibiotics and 42 vaccines. With regard to anthrax, instead of having to rush a sample to a lab where it takes hours or even days to culture, biotech companies have created test strips using antibody technologies that can confirm the presence of anthrax in 15 minutes or less, allowing decontamination and treatment to begin immediately. Similar test strips are being developed for the detection of smallpox as well. The biotech company EluSys Therapeutics is working on an exciting technique which would "implement instant immunity." EluSys joins two monoclonal antibodies chemically together so that they act like biological double-sided tape. One antibody sticks to toxins, viruses, or bacteria while the other binds to human red blood cells. The red blood cells carry the pathogen or toxin to the liver for destruction and return unharmed to the normal blood circulation. In one test, the EluSys treatment reduced the viral load in monkeys one million-fold in less than an hour. The technology could be applied to a number of bioterrorist threats, such as dengue fever, Ebola and Marburg viruses, and plague. Of course, the EluSys treatment would not just be useful for responding to bioterrorist attacks, but also could treat almost any infection or poisoning. Further down the development road are technologies that could rapidly analyze a pathogen’s DNA, and then guide the rapid synthesis of drugs like the ones being developed by EluSys that can bind, or disable, segments of DNA crucial to an infectious organism's survival. Again, this technology would be a great boon for treating infectious diseases and might be a permanent deterrent to future bioterrorist attacks. Seizing Bayer’s patent now wouldn’t just cost that company and its stockholders a little bit of money (Bayer sold $1 billion in Cipro last year), but would reverberate throughout the pharmaceutical research and development industry. If governments begin to seize patents on the pretext of addressing alleged public health emergencies, the investment in research that would bring about new and effective treatments could dry up. Investors and pharmaceutical executives couldn’t justify putting $30 billion annually into already risky and uncertain research if they couldn’t be sure of earning enough profits to pay back their costs. Consider what happened during the Clinton health care fiasco, which threatened to impose price controls on prescription drugs in the early 1990s: Growth in research spending dropped off dramatically from 10 percent annually to about 2 percent per year. A far more sensible and farsighted way to protect the American public from health threats, including bioterrorism, is to encourage further pharmaceutical research by respecting drug patents. In the final analysis, America’s best biodefense is a vital and profitable pharmaceutical and biotechnology industry.

Extinction

Steinbrenner, 97

John Steinbrenner, Senior Fellow – Brookings, Foreign Policy, 12-22-1997, Lexis  
Although human pathogens are often lumped with nuclear explosives and lethal chemicals as potential weapons of mass destruction, there is an obvious, fundamentally important difference: Pathogens are alive, weapons are not. Nuclear and chemical weapons do not reproduce themselves and do not independently engage in adaptive behavior; pathogens do both of these things. That deceptively simple observation has immense implications. The use of a manufactured weapon is a singular event. Most of the damage occurs immediately. The aftereffects, whatever they may be, decay rapidly over time and distance in a reasonably predictable manner. Even before a nuclear warhead is detonated, for instance, it is possible to estimate the extent of the subsequent damage and the likely level of radioactive fallout. Such predictability is an essential component for tactical military planning. The use of a pathogen, by contrast, is an extended process whose scope and timing cannot be precisely controlled. For most potential biological agents, the predominant drawback is that they would not act swiftly or decisively enough to be an effective weapon. But for a few pathogens - ones most likely to have a decisive effect and therefore the ones most likely to be contemplated for deliberately hostile use - the risk runs in the other direction. A lethal pathogen that could efficiently spread from one victim to another would be capable of initiating an intensifying cascade of disease that might ultimately threaten the entire world population. The 1918 influenza epidemic demonstrated the potential for a global contagion of this sort but not necessarily its outer limit.

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Engagement is the lynchpin of neoliberal expansion into Cuba

Wenston & Woods ’08 – political theorist and author and leading members of the International Marxist Tendency (Fred & Alan, “[Vultures hovering over Cuba after Fidel Castro steps down](http://www.cjournal.info/2008/02/20/vultures-hovering-over-cuba-after-fidel-castro-steps-down/)”, http://www.cjournal.info/2008/02/20/vultures-hovering-over-cuba-after-fidel-castro-steps-down/)MM

They all pretend to be democrats when it comes to Cuba. In reality they are like vultures waiting for the day they can get their beaks and claws into the flesh of Cuba. What they are after is the end of the economic system brought into being by the Cuban revolution. They want capitalism to return to Cuba. That is what they mean by “democracy”! Another fashionable term these days is “engagement”. While Bush sticks to his guns and insists on the embargo being stepped up, the more intelligent bourgeois, both in the USA and Europe are raising the need for “engagement”, i.e. on removing the embargo and opening up trade channels. Does this wing of the bourgeois have different interests or aims? No, they simply understand better than Bush and his obtuse circle of friends that the best way to re-introduce capitalism into Cuba is to lift the embargo, begin trading, flood Cuba with cash and let the process unfold.¶ That is why it is even more disgusting when we hear some reformist elements on the left advocating such “engagement”. What they are actually doing is giving the bourgeois advice on how to remove this thorn in their side.¶ All this talk of democracy is in fact a cover for the real aims of imperialism. Not so long ago the Financial Times was giving more sober advice. They were suggesting a “Chinese road” for Cuba accompanied by a lifting of the US-sponsored embargo. The Chinese model would envisage an opening up of Cuba to capitalism accompanied by a firm grip on state power at the top.

Neolibralism causes extinction through environmental destruction, space weaponization and nuclearwar – focus on short-term wealth and attempts to maintain superiority

Marko 2003—(“ Anarchism and Human Survival: Russell's Problem”, Indymedia UK,

<http://www.indymedia.org.uk/en/2003/05/68173.html> SW)

Bertrand Russell throughout his long career as a public intellectual and political activist had reason to reflect on the follies of humanity and the real threats to human survival, threats which are self induced. Much speculation and movie making is devoted toward such survival threatening events as asteroid strikes and mantle head plumes. What is totally ignored is the threat to human survival posed by our own institutions. We can notch another one for the propaganda model; it is to be expected that our pathological institutions would not dwell on their inherent pathology. We can expect nothing less of the corporate media. I shall argue that we face what I refer to as "Russell's problem": are Homo sapiens an intelligent maladaptive organism doomed to self extinction? There exists good reason to suppose that a maladaptive, intelligent, organism would indeed cause its own extinction simply because of the destructive potential of intelligence. This is one of the farces of many science fiction stories, such as Star Trek, which posit the existence of hideous innately war like but highly intelligent species. This is not a productive mix; surely any advanced species, in order to reach such heights as inter-galactic travel, would need to be a species that places a premium on cooperation and solidarity. An avaricious intelligent species would only over time succeed in destroying itself and much of the ecological basis for the support of life long before it would be able to traverse wormholes. There exist three threats to survival namely nuclear war, ecological change and north-south conflict. All three I would argue can be traced to a single source that being the pathological nature of state capitalism. What is frightening is that eventual self induced extinction is a rational consequence of our system of world order much like the destruction of the system of world order prior to 1914 was a rational consequence of its internal nature. I shall focus in this essay on nuclear war, the most immediate threat. In doing so we will come to appreciate the nexus between this threat, globalisation and north-south conflict. Currently we are witnessing a major expansion in the US global military system. One facet of this expansion is the globalisation of US nuclear war planning known as "adaptive planning". The idea here is that the US would be able to execute a nuclear strike against any target on Earth at very short notice. For strategic planners the world's population is what they refer to as a "target rich environment". The Clinton era commander of US nuclear forces, Admiral Mies, stated that nuclear ballistic missile submarines would be able to "move undetected to any launch point" threatening "any spot on Earth". What lies at the heart of such a policy is the desire to maintain global strategic superiority what is known as "full spectrum dominance" previously referred to as "escalation dominance". Full spectrum dominance means that the US would be able to wage and win any type of war ranging from a small scale contingency to general nuclear war. Strategic nuclear superiority is to be used to threaten other states so that they toe the party line. The Bush administration's Nuclear Posture Review stipulated that nuclear weapons are needed in case of "surprising military developments" not necessarily limited to chemical or biological weapons. The Clinton administration was more explicit stating in its 2001 Pentagon report to Congress that US nuclear forces are to "hedge against defeat of conventional forces in defense of vital interests". The passage makes clear that this statement is not limited to chemical or biological weapons. We have just seen in Iraq what is meant by the phrase "defense of vital interests". Washington is asserting that if any nation were to have the temerity to successfully defend itself against US invasion, armed with conventional weapons only, then instant annihilation awaits. "What we say goes" or you go is the message being conveyed. Hitler no doubt would have had a similar conception of "deterrence". It should be stressed that this is a message offered to the whole world after all it is now a target rich environment. During the cold war the US twice contemplated using nuclear weapons in such a fashion both in Vietnam, the first at Dien Bien Phu and during Nixon administration planning for "operation duck hook". In both cases the main impediments to US action were the notion that nuclear weapons were not politically "useable" in such a context and because of the Soviet deterrent. The Soviet deterrent is no more and the US currently is hotly pursuing the development of nuclear weapons that its designers believe will be "useable" what the Clinton administration referred to as low yield earth penetrating nuclear weapons and what the Bush administration refers to as the Rapid Nuclear Earth Penetrator. Such strategic reforms are meant to make nuclear war a more viable policy option, on the basis that lower yields will not immediately kill as many innocent people as higher yield weapons. This is known as the lowering of the threshold of nuclear war. The development of the RNEP draws us closer to the prospect of nuclear war, including accidental nuclear war, because lower yields will lower the barrier between conventional and nuclear war. There will exist no real escalatory firewall between these two forms of warfare which means that in any conventional crisis involving nuclear powers, there will exist a strong incentive to strike first. A relationship very similar to the interaction between the mobilisation schedules of the great powers prior to 1914. There exist strong parallels between US nuclear planning and the German Imperial Staffs Schlieffen plan. Lowering the threshold of nuclear war will also enhance pressures for global nuclear proliferation. If the US is making its arsenal more useable by working towards achieving a first strike capability, then others such as Russia and China must react in order to ensure the viability of their deterrents. Moreover, the potential third world targets of US attack would also have greater incentive to ensure that they also have a nuclear deterrent. It is also understood that the development of these nuclear weapons may require the resumption of nuclear testing, a key reason for the Administration's lack of readiness to abide by the CTBT treaty, which is meant to ban nuclear testing. The CTBT is a key feature of contemporary global nuclear non proliferation regimes for the US signed the CTBT in order to extend the nuclear non proliferation treaty (NPT) indefinitely. Abandoning the CTBT treaty, in order to develop a new generation of more "useable" nuclear weapons that will lower the threshold of nuclear war, will place the NPT regime under further strain and greatly increase the chances of further nuclear proliferation. There exists a "deadly connection" between global weapons of mass destruction proliferation and US foreign policy. One may well ask what has all this to do with state capitalism? Consider the thinking behind the militarisation of space, outlined for us by Space Command; historically military forces have evolved to protect national interests and investments  both military and economic. During the rise of sea commerce, nations built navies to protect and enhance their commercial interests. During the westward expansion of the continental United States, military outposts and the cavalry emerged to protect our wagon trains, settlements and roads. The document goes on, the emergence of space power follows both of these models. Moreover, the globalization of the world economy will continue, with a widening between haves and have nots. The demands of unilateral strategic superiority, long standing US policy known as "escalation" or "full spectrum" dominance, compel Washington to pursue space control". This means that, according to a report written under the chairmanship of Donald Rumsfeld, "in the coming period the US will conduct operations to, from, in and through space" which includes "power projection in, from and through space". Toward this end, Washington has resisted efforts in the UN to create an arms control regime for space. As a result there will inevitably arise an arms race in space. The importance of this simply cannot be over-emphasised. Throughout the nuclear age there have been a number of close calls, due to both human and technical error, that almost lead to a full scale nuclear exchange between Washington and Moscow. These glitches in command and control systems were ultimately benign because both sides had early warning satellites placed in specialised orbits which could be relied upon to provide real time imagery of nuclear missile launch sites. However the militarisation of space now means that these satellites will become open game; the benign environment in space will disappear if the militarisation of space continues. Thus if the US were to "conduct operations to, from in and through space" it will do see remotely. Technical failure may result in the system attacking Russian early warning satellites. Without question this would be perceived by the Russian's as the first shot in a US nuclear first strike. Consider for instance a curious event that occurred in 1995. A NASA research rocket, part of a study of the northern lights, was fired over Norway. The rocket was perceived by the Russian early warning system as the spear of a US first strike. The Russian system then began a countdown to full scale nuclear response; it takes only a single rocket to achieve this effect because it was no doubt perceived by Russian planners that this single rocket was meant to disable their command and control system as a result of electromagnetic pulse effects. To prevent the loss of all nuclear forces in a subsequent follow on strike the Russian's would need to launch a full scale response as soon as possible. Because the US itself has a hair trigger launch on warning posture a Russian attack would be followed by a full scale US attack; the US has a number of "reserve options" in its war plans, thus such an accidental launch could trigger a global chain of nuclear release around the globe. Calamity was averted in 1995 because Russia's early warning satellites would have demonstrated that there was no launch of US nuclear forces. If these satellites were to be taken out then this ultimate guarantee disappears; the Russian ground based radar system has a number of key holes that prevent it from warning of an attack through two key corridors, one from the Atlantic the other from the Pacific. In the future if an event such as 1995 were to occur in space the Russians no longer would have the level of comfort provided by its space based assets. The militarisation of space greatly increases the chances of a full scale accidental nuclear war. The militarisation of space is intimately linked with US strategic nuclear forces, for the previous command covering space, known as Space Command, has merged with the command responsible for nuclear forces, Strategic Command. Upon merger, the commander of Strategic Command stated, "United States Strategic Command provides a single war fighting combatant command with a global perspective, focused on exploiting the strong and growing synergy between the domain of space and strategic capabilities." The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff added, "this new command is going to have all the responsibilities of its predecessors, but an entirely new mission focus, greatly expanded forces and you might even say several infinite areas of responsibility." In other words, we are witnessing the integration of strategic conventional, nuclear and space planning into the command responsible for overseeing US nuclear forces. In turn these forces become an ordinary facet of US strategic planning, severing the break between conventional and nuclear war. The link between the increase in threats to survival and state capitalism (as well as globalisation) was provided for us by the old Space Command as noted above. We may justly also conclude that US nuclear weapons provide a shield, or shadow, enabling the deployment of offensive military firepower in what Kennedy era commander General Maxwell Taylor referred to as the key theatre of war, namely "under-developed areas". This shield was made effective by "escalation dominance", as noted above, now known as "full spectrum dominance". It is this facet of US strategic policy that compels Washington place such a premium on nuclear superiority and nuclear war fighting. The link between US nuclear strategy and the global political economy is intimate. US nuclear weapons, both during and after the cold war, have acted as the ultimate guarantors of US policy, which is concerned with managing the world capitalist system in the interests of dominant domestic elites. Nuclear weapons provide the umbrella of power under which the system is able to function in much the same way that Karl Polanyi in his classic work, The Great Transformation, argued that the balance of power functioned in the service of the world capitalist system in the 19th century. The great restoration of the world capitalist system, under the rubric of liberal internationalism, and the onset of the nuclear age in the wake of the second world war, are not merely coincidental. To understand the contours of contemporary world order is to appreciate the deep nexus between the two. Military superiority is necessary because of threats to "stability". It is to be expected that a system of world order constructed for the benefit of an elite core of corporate interests in the US will not go down well with the world's population, especially in key regions singled out for capital extraction such as the Middle East and Latin America. Planners recognise that the pursuit of capital globalisation and the consequent widening of the gap between rich and poor would be opposed by the globe's population. Absolute strategic superiority is meant to keep the world's population quite and obedient out of sheer terror, as Bush administration aligned neo-conservative thinkers have argued it is better that Washington be feared rather than loved. As they have asserted, after world war two US hegemony had to be "obtained", now it must be "maintained" (Robert Kagan and William Kristol). It is only natural that this "maintenance operation" should be a militaristic one given that the US has a comparative advantage in the use of force; a nuclear global first strike capability would give Washington an absolute advantage. Should anyone get out of line, possibly threatening to spread the "virus" of popular social and economic development, force is to be used to restore "credibility" to beat down the threat of a better example. The US pursues a dangerous nuclear strategy because such a strategy in its terms is "credible". Anarchists are well aware of this important aspect of international relations given the events of the Spanish Civil War. Such a situation is no joke, for this was precisely the fear of Kennedy era planners that led to the Cuban Missile Crisis. Washington sought to return Cuba to the "Latin American mode" fearing that Cuba would set an example to the population of Latin America in independent social and economic planning conducted in the interests of the population rather than US capital. In response to the Castro takeover the US engaged in one of the most serious terrorist campaigns of recent times, meant as a prelude to invasion in order to ensure "regime change" thereby teaching the people of the region the lesson that "what we say goes". One of the key reasons why Khrushchev sought to place nuclear missiles in Cuba was to deter a US invasion and to achieve strategic parity with Washington. Throughout the Cuban Missile Crisis many potential flashpoints almost lead to a full-scale nuclear exchange between the Soviet Union and the US, how close we came to annihilation is only now being fully realised. These are not matters for idle speculation: destruction almost occurred in the past and may very well occur in the future; even cats have only nine lives. This is a matter of great contemporary significance because of the current geographical expansion of the US military system. One of the most significant results of the invasion of Afghanistan was the expansion of the US military system into Central Asia, including into some former Soviet republics. The Russians have traditionally considered this to be their version of the Western hemisphere. If a "great game" were to develop in the region between Russia and the US (perhaps also Pakistan, China and India all nuclear powers, Turkey which sits under US "extended deterrence" and Iran, a potential nuclear power) then such a "great game" may become a nuclearised great game. Indeed the standoff in Kashmir may have global consequences if a system of alliance politics were to develop in the region between the globe's nuclear powers, especially as the threshold of nuclear war is being lowered. In this sense Central Asia may develop into a global version of the link between the Balkans and central alliance systems prior to 1914. Of even greater concern is the further expansion of the US military system into the Middle East following the invasion of Iraq. Washington has already foreshadowed a desire to construct permanent military bases in Iraq in order to facilitate intervention into the region. Both Iran and Syria are potential targets of US attack. Iran may decide upon the nuclear option in order to deter the globes leading rogue state. This could be potentially explosive because it is well known that Israel posses a significant nuclear force. Israel has always feared that its paymaster would ultimately abandon it. In response Israel has reportedly developed a "samson option" nuclear targeting strategy. The idea is that Israel would target Russia with its nuclear weapons (Israel has developed delivery systems with an excessive range capability), which would lead to a full-scale nuclear exchange between Moscow and Washington. In essence Israel is saying: we should be allowed to continue repressing the Palestinians if not we have the "samson option". Furthermore, in order to facilitate intervention into these regions the US has began a programme to shift the basing of its military forces into "new Europe" that is Eastern Europe. Washington for instance pushed Romania into NATO for this very reason. Placing military forces in Eastern Europe no doubt would give the Russians some cause for concern. After Kosovo Russia conducted large-scale war games assuming an invasion through "new Europe". The game ended with the release of nuclear weapons. Indeed, expanding the US military system up to the border of Belarus may be dangerous for it is quite possible that Russia extends nuclear deterrence to Minsk; for instance Russia is building a new ground based strategic early warning radar in Belarus. This may all become a series problem in the future because of what the US Geological Survey refers to as "the big rollover": the time at which the world oil market changes from a buyers market into a sellers market (which may occur in the next 15-20 years). Washington has always regarded the oil resources of the Middle East as "the most stupendous material prize in world history" which is a key lever of US global dominance. The big rollover will ensure that Middle Eastern oil reserves will become an even more significant lever of world control placing greater premium on US control over the political development of the Arab world. In 1967, 1970 and 1973 strategic developments in the Middle East were overshadowed by nuclear weapons. In fact the events of 1970 and 1973 convinced many, such as Henry Kissinger, that the US needed to strive to retain nuclear superiority and reverse the condition of strategic parity with Moscow. This ultimately lead to the Carter-Reagan build-up of the late 1970s and early 1980s; a build-up which easily could have been disastrous. The militarisation of space, the development of so called "useable" nuclear weapons, the globalisation of the US nuclear planning system, the hair trigger alert status of the globe's nuclear forces and the expansion of the US military system into Central Asia and the Middle East possibly triggering a "great game" in these regions between nuclear powers, not to mention military expansion into "new Europe", all seriously increase the threats to our long term (indeed short term) survival. Washington's aggressive nuclear strategy is not only meant to deter democracy abroad; it is also meant to deter democracy at home. In 1956 the author of NSC 68 and one of the chief ideologues behind the Carter-Reagan nuclear build-up, Paul Nitze, made a distinction between what he referred to as "declaratory" nuclear weapons policy and "actual" nuclear weapons policy. For anybody interested in unravelling truth from fiction the distinction is critical. In Nitze's words, "the word 'policy' is used in two related but different senses. In one sense, the action sense, it refers to the general guidelines, which we believe should and will govern our actions in various contingencies. In the other sense, the declaratory sense, it refers to policy statements which have as their aim political and psychological effects". The most important target audience of declaratory policy is the American population, the so-called "internal deterrent". Consider for instance the key nuclear proliferation planning document of the cold war era, the Gilpatric report delivered to President Johnson. In it Gilpatric spelt out the threat that nuclear proliferation poses to US security: "as additional nations obtained nuclear weapons our diplomatic and military influence would wane, and strong pressures would arise to retreat to isolation to avoid the risk of involvement in nuclear war". So if it were seen by the population that the pursuit of foreign policy, conducted in the interests of domestic elites, would increase the threat of nuclear war then the internal deterrent may become dangerously aroused possibly calling off the show. In the strategic literature this is referred to as self-deterrence. In other words US non proliferation policy was meant to lock in US strategic dominance so that the domestic population would not become dangerously aroused whilst providing Washington the freedom of action necessary to brandish its nuclear superiority over others. This sentiment was reflected in the Bush administrations Nuclear Posture Review, nuclear capabilities also assure the US public that the United States will not be subject to coercion based on a false perception of U.S. weakness among potential adversaries. Many strategic thinkers have argued that the greatest threat to US hegemony or "unipolarity" is the internal "welfare role" and the populations lack of understanding for the burdens of Empire, in other words popular democracy. One of the reasons that the Reagan administration pursued "Star Wars" a programme to render nuclear weapons "impotent and obsolete" was to outflank the domestic and global peace movements that were gathering pace as a result of the administration's pursuit of potentially apocalyptic nuclear policies (the very same people have their fingers on the button again). It was well recognised that the Star Wars programme would have increased the chances of a nuclear exchange between Moscow and Washington, just as today the pursuit of short term interests is known to have potentially serious international consequences, such as increase in conflict and global weapons of mass destruction proliferation. The ruling class is well aware of the adverse impact the pursuit of its own sectional interests will have on international order. It pursues those interests with renewed zeal anyway. As far as the ruling class is concerned the greatest threat we face is not nuclear war, it is popular democracy. As Adam Smith observed of a previous mercantile system, applicable to today's system of state-corporate mercantilism, "it cannot be very difficult to determine who have been the contrivers of this whole mercantile system; not the consumers, we may believe, whose interest has been entirely neglected; but the producers, whose interest has been so carefully attended to; and among this latter class our merchants and manufacturers have been by far the principal architects." Policy Smith observed, "comes from an order of men, whose interest is never exactly the same with that of the public, who have generally an interest to deceive and even to oppress the public, and who accordingly have, upon many occasions, both deceived and oppressed it." This raises an interesting issue, namely that the pursuit of Armageddon is quite rational. The dominant institutions of capitalism place a premium on short-term greed. Rational participatory planning incorporating long-term concerns such as human survival are of no interest to these pathological institutions. What matters is short-term profit maximisation. One can see this most clearly in the case of such externalities as ecological change where the desire to pursue short-term profit undermines the long-term viability of the system itself (also us as a species; indeed many have surmised that we are in the era of the sixth great extinction of life on Earth this time human induced). The fact that the institutional structures of society compel the ruling classes to pursue highly dangerous security policies that are another externality of the system of state capitalism compels the population to constrain and eventually overthrow these institutions because apocalypse is institutionally rational. This brings us back however to Russell's problem. How do we answer Russells problem? There are those who do believe it can be answered, in the affirmative that is. Really this is just about the entire intellectual class which spins tails about human nature, most especially what are referred to as evolutionary psychologists and realist international relations thinkers; their doctrines are essentially prophecies of doomsday. Russell himself stated, "I am no prophet. Mankind perhaps decided that it has existed long enough and its time has come to yield the place to the animals we have hitherto considered lower. This is the view of those who are called statesmen and realists. For those actually interested in human freedom and survival Russells problem is to be solved in the manner Bertrand Russell himself sought to solve it; not by lofty speculations and social theories but by political dissidence in all its manifestations. Chomsky has stated that the people of the third world rely on a thin margin of survival provided by turbulence and dissidence within the imperial states. In fact humanity relies on a thin margin of survival provided by turbulence and dissidence within the imperial states. The global justice movement has an awesome responsibility: human survival depends upon its success. The concerns expressed in this essay ought to occupy more of its time.

ALT: We need to take back politics – systems of politics are sustained only by our engagement with them – working w/in doesn’t solve

Meszaros 8 (Istvan, Chair of Philosophy at the University of Sussex, The Challenge and Burden of Historical Time, p323-328)

The unreality of postulation the sustainable solution of the grave problems of our social order within the formal and legal framework and corresponding constraints of parliamentary politics arises from the fundamental misconception of the structural determinations of capital’s rule, as represented in all varieties that assert the dualism of civil society and the political state. The difficulty, insurmountable within the parliamentary framework is this that since capital is actually in control of all vital aspects of the social metabolism, it can afford to define the separately constituted sphere of political legitimation as a strictly formal and legal matter, thereby necessarily excluding the possibility of being legitimately challenged in its substantive sphere of socioeconomic reproductive operation. Directly or indirectly, capital controls everything, including the parliamentary legislative process, even in the latter is supposed to be fully independent from capital in many theories that fictitiously hypostatize the “democratic equality” of all political forces participating in the legislative process. TO envisage a very different relationship to the powers of decision making in our societies, now completely dominated by the forces of capital in every domain, it is necessary to radically challenge capital itself as the overall controller of social metabolic reproduction. What makes this problem worse for all those who are looking for significant change on the margins of the established political system is that the later can claim for itself genuine constitutional legitimacy in its present mode of functioning, based on the historically constituted inversion of the actual state of the material reproductive affairs. For inasmuch as the capital is not only the “personification of capital” but simultaneously functions also “as the personification of the social character of labor, of the total workshop as such,” the system can claim to represent the vitally necessary productive power of society vis-à-vis the individuals as the basis of their continued existence, incorporating the interest of all. In this way capital asserts itself not only as the de facto but also the de jure power of society, in its capacity as the objectively given necessary condition of societal reproduction, and thereby as the constitutional foundation to its own political order. The fact that the constitutional legitimacy of capital is historically founded on the ruthless expropriation of the conditions of social metabolic reproduction- the means and material of labor-from the producers, and therefore capital’s claimed “constitutionality” (like the origin of all constitutions) is unconstitutional, is an unpalatable truth which fades away in the mist of a remote past. The “social productive powers of labor, or productive power or social labor, first develop historically with the specifically capitalist mode of production, hence appear as something immanent in the capital-relation and inseparable from it. This is how capital’s mode of social metabolic reproduction becomes eternalized and legitimated as a lawfully unchallengeable system. Legitimate contest is admissible only in relation to some minor aspects of the unalterable overall structure. The real state of affairs on thee plane of socioeconomic reproduction-i.e., the actually exercised productive power of labor and its absolute necessity for securing capital’s own reproduction- disappears from sight. Partly because of the ignorance of the very far from legitimate historical origin of capital’s “primitive accumulation” and the concomitant, frequently violent, expropriation of property as the precondition of the system’s present mode of functioning; and partly because of the mystifying nature of the established productive and distributive relations. As Marx notes: The objective conditions of labor do not appear as subsumed under the worker; rather, he appears as subsumed under them. Capital employs Labor. Even this relation is in its simplicity is a personification of things and a reification of persons. None of this can be challenged and remedied within the framework of parliamentary political reform. It would be quite absurd to expect the abolition of the “personification of things and the reification of persons” by political decree, and just as absurd to expect the proclamation of such an intended reform within the framework of capital’s political institutions. For the capital system cannot function without the perverse overturning of the relationship between persons and things: capital’s alienated and reified powers dominate the masses of the people. Similarly it would be a miracle if the workers who confront capital in the labor process as “isolated workers” could reacquire mastery over the social productive powers of their labor by some political decree, or even by a whole series of parliamentary reforms enacted under capital’s order of social metabolic control. For in these matters there can be no way of avoiding the irreconcilable conflict over the material stakes of “either/or” Capital can neither abdicate its-usurped-social productive powers in favor of labor, nor can I share them with labor, thanks to some wishful but utterly fictitious “political compromise.” For they constitute the overall controlling power of societal reproduction in the form of “the rule of wealth over society.” Thus it is impossible to escape, in the domain of the fundamental social metabolism, the severe logic of either/or. For either wealth, in the shape of capital, continues to rule over human society, taking it to the brink of self-destruction, or the society of associated producers learns to rule over alienated and reified wealth, with productive powers arising from the self-determinated social labor of its individual-but not longer isolated-members. Capital is the extra-parliamentary force par excellence. It cannot possibly be politically constrained by parliament in its power of social metabolic control. This is why the only mode of political representation compatible with capital’s mode of functioning is one that effectively denies the possibility of contesting its material power. And precisely because capital is the extra-parliamentary force par excellence, it has nothing to fear from the reforms that can be enacted within its parliamentary political framework. Since the vital issue on which everything else hinges is that “the objective conditions of labor do not appear as subsumed under the worker” buy, on the contrary, “he appears as subsumed under them,” no meaningful change is feasible without addressing the issue both in a form of politics capable of matching capital’s extra-parliamentary powers and modes of action, and in the domain of material reproduction. Thus the only challenge that could affect the power of capital, in a sustainable manner, is one which would simultaneously aim at assuming the system’s key productive functions, and at acquiring control over the corresponding political decision making processes in all spheres, instead of being hopelessly constrained by the circular confinement of institutionally legitimated political action to parliamentary legislation. There is a great deal of critique of formerly leftwing political figures and of their now fully accommodating parties in the political debates of the last decades. However, what is problematic about such debates is that by overemphasizing the role of personal ambition and failure, they often continue to envisage remedying the situation with in the same political institutional framework that, in fact, greatly favors the criticized “personal betrayals” and the painful “party derailments.” Unfortunately, though the advocated and hoped for personal and government changes tend to reproduce the same deplorable results. All this could not be very surprising. The reason why the now established political institutions successfully resist significant change for the better is because they are themselves part of the problem and not of the solution. For in their immanent nature they are the embodiment of the underlying structural determinations and contradictions through which the modern capitalist state- with its ubiquitous network of bureaucratic constituents- has been articulated and stabilized in the course of the last four hundred years. Naturally, the state was formed not as a one-sided mechanical result but through its necessary reciprocal interrelationship to the material ground of capital’s historical unfolding, as not only being shaped by the latter but also actively shaping it as much as historically feasible under the prevailing- and precisely through the interrelationship also changing- circumstances. Given the insuperably centrifugal determination of capital’s productive microcosms, even at the level of the giant quasi-monopolistic transnational corporations, only the modern state could assume and fulfill the required function of being the overall command structure of the capital system. Inevitably, that meant the complete alienation of the power of overall decision making from the producers. Even the “particular personifications of capital” were strictly mandated to act in accord with the structural imperatives of their system. Indeed the modern state, as constituted on the material ground of the capital system, is the paradigm of alienation as regards the power of comprehensive decision making. It would be therefore extremely naïve to imagine that the capitalist state could willingly hand over the alienated power of systemic decision making to any rival actor who operates within the legislative framework of parliament. Thus, in order to envisage a meaningful and historically sustainable societal change, it is necessary to submit to a radical critique both the material reproductive and the political inter-determinations of the entire system, and not simply some of the contingent and limited political practices. The combined totality of the material reproductive determinations and the all-embracing political command structure of the state together constitutes the overpowering reality of the capital system. In this sense, in view of the unavoidable question arising from the challenge of systemic determinations, with regard to both socioeconomic reproduction and the state, the need for a comprehensive political transformation-in close conjunction to the meaningful exercise of society’s vital productive functions without which far-reaching and lasting political change is inconceivable-becomes inseparable from the problem characterized as the wither away of the state. Accordingly, in the historic task of accomplishing “the withering away of the state,” self-management through full participation, and the permanently sustainable overcoming of parliamentarism by a positive form of substantive decision-making are inseparable. This is a vital concern and not “romantic faithfulness to Marx’s unrealizable dream,” as some people try to discredit and dismiss it. In truth, the “withering away of the state” refers to nothing mysterious or remote but to a perfectly tangible process that must be initiated right in our own historical time. It means, in plain language, the progressive reacquisition of the alienated power of political decision making by the individuals in their enterprise of moving toward a genuine socialist society. Without the reacquisition of this power- to which not only the capitalist state but also the paralyzing inertia of the structurally well-entrenched material reproductive practices are fundamentally opposed- neither the new mode of political control of society as a whole by its individuals is conceivable, nor indeed the nonadversarial and thereby cohesive and plannable everyday operation of the particular productive and distributive units by the self-managing freely associated producers. Radically superseding adversariality, and thereby securing the material and political ground of globally viable planning- an absolute must for the very survival of humanity, not to mention the potentially enriched self realization- of its individual members- its synonymous with the withering away of the state as an ongoing historical enterprise.

Case

The Cuban transition will be gradual and stable – Diaz-Canel makes a political transition inevitable

López-Levy, 13 - PhD candidate at the Josef Korbel School of International Studies at the University of Denver (Arturo, “Getting Ready for Post-Castro Cuba,” The National Interest, 4/10, http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/getting-ready-post-castro-cuba-8316)

In the last five years, the Cuban government has created an important institutional foundation for a parallel transition to a mixed economy (symbolized by the encouragement of non-state-sector firms) and a post-totalitarian relationship between the state and civil society (symbolized by relaxed travel restrictions). With the election of a new Council of State in February, the last phase of the transition to the post-Castro era began. Raúl Castro was reelected to the presidency, and for the first time a leader born after 1959, Miguel Díaz-Canel, became his second in command. Although this gradual transition is unfolding with the same party and president in power, one can begin to discern a new leadership and changing priorities. Looking at the Communist Party as a corporation (an analogy that should not be abused), Díaz-Canel is a manager who has served at various levels of the production chain. He worked at its foundation, as a university teacher and youth leader. Later, in the strategic provinces of Villa Clara and Holguin, he administered the implementation of economic reforms and directed the opening of the economy to foreign investment and tourism—all while maintaining party control over both processes. Díaz-Canel is part of the network of provincial party czars who are important in the implementation of the proposed changes, particularly decentralization. Having worked in central and eastern Cuba, the new first vice president has cordial ties with regional commanders of the armed forces—the other pillar, along with the Communist Party, of the current Cuban system. He is a civilian, the first in the line of succession to have little military experience. But he is steeped in the networks of power and well versed in carefully managing reform. Challenges for Cuban Leaders If Cuba implements the type of mixed economy proposed by the last Congress of the Communist Party—a new, more vital relationship with its diaspora and the world—it may also experience a political transformation. As the economy and society change, the political status quo cannot hold. The rise of market mechanisms and an autonomous non-state sector will reinforce the newly open flows of information, investment and technology. These new sectors will seek representation in the political arena. Citizens will have greater access to the Internet, and will be able to associate more horizontally. For at least the next five years, this does not imply a transition to multiparty democracy. But economic liberalization will force an expansion of the current system. Economic and migration opportunities will channel some of the energy in the direction of new businesses and travel, but it will not be enough. The party system will be reformed in order to remain at the helm of social and economic life. Political liberalization will probably start in the lower rungs of government, allowing citizens to vent their frustrations at that level. Raúl Castro’s decision to limit leadership positions to two terms, at a time when the older generation is leaving power by attrition, will result in a more institutionalized leadership that promotes younger leaders in an orderly fashion.

Lifting the embargo would pressure Cuba for rapid reforms

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Still, in a country where Cubans “resolve” their way around government restrictions every day (private deals with customs agents are common), many Cubans anticipate real benefits should the United States change course. Mr. López, a meticulous mechanic who wears plastic gloves to avoid dirtying his fingers, said legalizing imports and investment would create a flood of the supplies that businesses needed, overwhelming the government’s controls while lowering prices and creating more work apart from the state. Other Cubans, including political dissidents, say softening the embargo would increase the pressure for more rapid change by undermining one of the government’s main excuses for failing to provide freedom, economic opportunity or just basic supplies. “Last month, someone asked me to redo their kitchen, but I told them I couldn’t do it because I didn’t have the materials,” said Pedro José, 49, a licensed carpenter in Havana who did not want his last name published to avoid government pressure. “Look around — Cuba is destroyed,” he added, waving a hand toward a colonial building blushing with circles of faded pink paint from the 1950s. “There is a lot of work to be done.”

Slow change key to Cuban reform - avoids rapid regime collapse

Feinberg 11 - professor of international political economy at UC San Dieg, nonresident senior fellow with the Latin America Initiative at Brookings (Richard E., “Reaching Out: Cuba’s New Economy and the International Response”, November, Brookings, http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2011/11/18%20cuba%20feinberg/1118\_cuba\_feinberg.pdf)//ID

Gradualism: Gradualism in economic reform—as opposed to an Eastern European-style sudden regime collapse—appears to be the most likely scenario that Cuba will follow. As a result of economic reforms, albeit halting and partial, Cuba today is different from the Cuba of 1989 . In 2011, Cuba’s current leadership, however aging and proud, promulgated reform guidelines that recognize the imperative of change and that empower the pro-reform factions. Moreover, as suggested by successful Asian experiences (Vietnam, Malaysia, Singapore, China), where political leadership provides stability and continuity, gradualism can be a feasible—indeed it may well be the only realistic—option. Gradualism must not, however, be an excuse for policy paralysis or a smoke-screen for maintenance of the status quo.

Rapid change risks Cuban civil war

Feinberg 11 - professor of international political economy at UC San Dieg, nonresident senior fellow with the Latin America Initiative at Brookings (Richard E., “Reaching Out: Cuba’s New Economy and the International Response”, November, Brookings, <http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2011/11/18%20cuba%20feinberg/1118_cuba_feinberg.pdf>)//ID

Some in the United States have long supported severe sanctions intended to starve the Cuban regime of resources and thereby precipitate a political breakdown . Yet, within the national security bureaucracy of the U .S . Executive Branch, notwithstanding occasional presidential rhetoric, there is a strong preference for gradual, peaceful evolution in Cuba . A sudden breakdown, it is feared, would entail substantial risks for U .S . interests, including an immigration crisis right off of our shores, and in the worst case, irresistible pressures for intervention to quell a bloody civil war and halt a mass exodus of refugees.

This turns every part of the aff

NAÍM, 1 – editor of Foreign Policy (MOISÉS, “When Countries go Crazy”, MARCH 1, 2001, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2001/03/01/when\_countries\_go\_crazy)//eek

Some countries can drive other countries crazy. When people have this effect on one another, it is because of imbalances in the brain’s neurotransmitters. With countries, it often happens because of the disproportionate influence of special interests. Cuba, for example, has long driven the United States crazy. Just think of the Bay of Pigs invasion or the outsourcing of Castro's assassination to the Mafia. For more recent examples of irrational behavior, think of the Helms-Burton Law or Elián. The problem is that Cuba not only drives the United States crazy but also seems to induce some acute form of learning disability among U.S. politicians. Cuba makes them forget -- or unlearn -- everything the world has painfully discovered about the transition from communism. This knowledge can be distilled into five simple maxims: Lesson one: Failure is more common than success in the transition to a democratic market economy. Lesson two: The less internationally integrated, more centralized, and more personalized a former communist regime was, the more traumatic and unsuccessful its transition will be. Lesson three: Dismantling a communist state is far easier and faster than building a functional replacement for it. Lesson four: The brutal, criminal ways of a powerful Communist party with a tight grip on public institutions are usually supplanted by the brutal, criminal ways of powerful private business conglomerates with a tight grip on public institutions. Lesson five: Introducing a market economy without a strong and effective state capable of regulating it gives resourceful entrepreneurs more incentive to emulate Al Capone than Bill Gates. It is therefore safe to assume that if the Castro regime suddenly implodes, Cuba will end up looking more like Albania than the Bahamas. But that is not the assumption on which U.S politicians base their efforts to hasten Castro's demise. Although a lot of money, political capital, and thought have been expended trying to overthrow the Cuban government, ideas about what to do the morning after are scarce and often unrealistic. They usually hinge on the expectation that in the post-Castro era democracy will emerge and Cuban-American exiles will lead other investors in transforming Cuba into a capitalist hub. More likely is that instead of a massive flow of foreign investment into Cuba, the United States will get a massive inflow of refugees escaping the chaos of a post-Castro regime. Frictions between Cuban-Cubans and Miami-Cubans will make politics nasty and unstable. New investments and privatizations will be mired in the legal mess produced by the 5,911 claims to property in Cuba (valued at more than $17 billion) that have been filed with the United States Claims Commission by former property owners. (That amounts to nearly seven years' worth of Cuban exports.) The Cuban public sector is inextricably intertwined with the Communist Party, so the demise of the party will paralyze the government, at least for a while. And the cost of any resulting humanitarian crisis will mainly be borne by U.S. taxpayers, who will likely pay much more than the $2 billion spent containing the influx of Haitian refugees in 1994. But can't the World Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank, and the International Monetary Fund support Cuba's transition with money, experts, and projects? Sure, except that the United States forbids them from spending even a dollar to prepare themselves and Cuba for the coming transition. The result is that these institutions are not ready to help Cuba. Again, the United States forgets a useful lesson from another continent: The day after Yasser Arafat and Yitzhak Rabin shook hands at the White House in 1993, the World Bank -- ­­­which had been instructed to prepare for the event -- was immediately ready to lend and invest in projects under the control of the Palestinian Authority, even though the authority was not and still is not a member of the bank. Allowing such an initiative in Cuba's case would cost U.S. taxpayers nothing and would help plan for the challenges ahead. Also, training Cuban professionals to run a modern market economy is bound to be a better investment for the United States than blocking academic exchanges with the island. The rational, self-interested approach for the United States that also avoids much future human pain in Cuba is to concentrate all efforts on ensuring as smooth a transition as possible. This view, of course, is not shared by all. U.S. Senator Jesse Helms recently said that "the opponents of the Cuban embargo are about to run into a brick wall on the other end of Pennsylvania Avenue. President Bush is a committed supporter of the embargo." The failure of the U.S. trade embargo against Cuba to achieve its stated objectives over the last 40 years is dismissed by Senator Helms and some Cuban-Americans who argue that the embargo has never been vigorously implemented. Perhaps, as Senator Helms predicts, things are about to change and the aging Cuban dictator will finally fall. If Cuba collapses and becomes a failed state 90 miles away from U.S. shores, the epicenter of the Caribbean drug trade, the source of a massive flood of refugees to the United States, a corruption haven, and a black hole for substantial sums of U.S. aid, President Bush will have no one to blame but himself. Or, more precisely, the powerful interest groups that blinded him to the lessons of experience.

Multilateralism

No risk of Middle East war   
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Yet, the Saudis, Iranians, Jordanians, Syrians, and others are very unlikely to go to war either to protect their own sect or ethnic group or to prevent one country from gaining the upper hand in Iraq. The reasons are fairly straightforward. First, Middle Eastern leaders, like politicians everywhere, are primarily interested in one thing: self-preservation. Committing forces to Iraq is an inherently risky proposition, which, if the conflict went badly, could threaten domestic political stability. Moreover, most Arab armies are geared toward regime protection rather than projecting power and thus have little capability for sending troops to Iraq. Second, there is cause for concern about the so-called blowback scenario in which jihadis returning from Iraq destabilize their home countries, plunging the region into conflict. Middle Eastern leaders are preparing for this possibility. Unlike in the 1990s, when Arab fighters in the Afghan jihad against the Soviet Union returned to Algeria, Egypt and Saudi Arabia and became a source of instability, Arab security services are being vigilant about who is coming in and going from their countries. In the last month, the Saudi government has arrested approximately 200 people suspected of ties with militants. Riyadh is also building a 700 kilometer wall along part of its frontier with Iraq in order to keep militants out of the kingdom. Finally, there is no precedent for Arab leaders to commit forces to conflicts in which they are not directly involved. The Iraqis and the Saudis did send small contingents to fight the Israelis in 1948 and 1967, but they were either ineffective or never made it. In the 1970s and 1980s, Arab countries other than Syria, which had a compelling interest in establishing its hegemony over Lebanon, never committed forces either to protect the Lebanese from the Israelis or from other Lebanese. The civil war in Lebanon was regarded as someone else's fight. Indeed, this is the way many leaders view the current situation in Iraq. To Cairo, Amman and Riyadh, the situation in Iraq is worrisome, but in the end it is an Iraqi and American fight. As far as Iranian mullahs are concerned, they have long preferred to press their interests through proxies as opposed to direct engagement. At a time when Tehran has access and influence over powerful Shiite militias, a massive cross-border incursion is both unlikely and unnecessary. So Iraqis will remain locked in a sectarian and ethnic struggle that outside powers may abet, but will remain within the borders of Iraq. The Middle East is a region both prone and accustomed to civil wars. But given its experience with ambiguous conflicts, the region has also developed an intuitive ability to contain its civil strife and prevent local conflicts from enveloping the entire Middle East.

Multilateralism is impossible  
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First, American presidents have always maintained a policy of strategic flexibility. Foreign policy initiatives have been multilateral if possible, but unilateral if necessary. This has been the historical precedent. The assertion that any one administration is “unilateralist” while others have been “multilateralist” is grossly overdone. In fact, the administrations of George H.W. Bush, Bill Clinton, and George W. Bush have each acted unilaterally. In 1989, George H.W. Bush unilaterally ordered American forces to invade Panama and capture Manuel Noriega. The Clinton administration bypassed the UN Security Council and intervened in Kosovo with military force. Later, Bill Clinton authorized the unilateral bombings of sites in Afghanistan and Sudan after Al-Qaeda’s 1998 terrorist attacks against U.S. embassies in Africa. Even the George W. Bush administration’s much derided aversion to the Kyoto Protocol and International Criminal Court (ICC) has followed similar attitudes held by the Clinton administration. Also important is the fact that presidential preferences do not absolutely dictate foreign policy. Deference for maximum maneuverability resides not only in the Executive Branch, but also in Congress and in wider public opinion. U.S. democracy requires the consideration of domestic political forces that sometimes prefer unilateral prescriptions even more than the administration. Treaties have to be ratified and budgets must be passed by members of Congress representing a diverse patchwork of constituent and interest groups. Indeed, the traditional bipartisan consensus affirming unilateral optionality is unlikely to change, especially in the face of grave threats from terrorism and rogue regimes. Even in a world of international organizations and regional alliances, the Westphalian centrality of sovereign nation-states has not changed. To ensure state survival, foreign policy naturally should be shaped by national interests. Thus, when faced with threats, according to Hans Morgenthau, countries must “do what they cannot help but do: protect their physical, political, and cultural identity against encroachments by other nations.”3 When necessary, the United States cannot be expected to act any differently. Second, U.S. leadership in the international system precludes it from adopting the “high multilateralism” envisioned by some critics of American foreign policy. As David Skidmore puts it, genuine multilateralism, “in theory or practice,” requires an absolute commitment to (1) “invest in the creation and maintenance of international institutions,” and (2) “comply with the rules, norms, principles, and decision-making processes of these institutions on an equal basis with other states.”4 After World War II, the United States was instrumental in creating most of today’s international organizations and arrangements—from the United Nations to the World Bank—across the security and economic landscape. In doing so, the United States satisfied the first prerequisite of “high multilateralism” by vigorously constructing and investing in international organizations—in fact, it still provides 22 percent of the UN budget. Yet no president has allowed the U.S. [End Page 46] to be completely constrained by the delineating limits of the international system. As Ruth Wedgwood has noted, “in Security Council multilateralism, the United States has never operated quite as its founders envisioned.” 5 Because a superpower bears exceptional structural responsibilities, it is unreasonable to expect the United States to unfailingly adopt the second commitment of “high multilateralism.” Global security, for instance, has largely depended on the involvement of the United States in hot spots and theatres that push beyond the envelope of America’s own self interest. Thus, the complex role and broad reach of U.S. military forces makes complete oversight by an International Criminal Court (ICC) almost materially impossible. And leadership sometimes requires boldness. The United States was a tireless fighter for a World Trade Organization built on free trade, but it has also faced criticism (and sometimes WTO violations) for economic actions against brutal regimes such as Burma and Cuba. From the start, American values and power have shaped today’s international system, not the other way around. For example, a U.S. document entitled “The Essential Points in the Charter of the International Organizations” served as a draft version for the UN Charter.6 Indeed, the United States built and now maintains the international system “not as an alternative to U.S. supremacy, but as an expression of it.”7 But, unlike past empires, the United States does not use its strength to achieve imperial dominion. Instead, the United States uses its enormous influence to champion the principles of democracy, human rights, and free markets. Many of these universal ideals have been transmitted both to and through the disparate bodies, conventions, and treaties that form multilateral fora. In short, the stability and public welfare engendered by the international system are often because of, not in spite of, American exceptionalism.

Cooperation inev—diplomacy not key   
Wohlforth 9—Daniel Webster Professor of Government, Dartmouth. BA in IR, MA in IR and MPhil and PhD in pol sci, Yale (William and Stephen Brooks, Reshaping the World Order, March / April 2009, Foreign Affairs Vol. 88, Iss. 2; pg. 49, 15 pgs)   
FOR ANALYSTS such as Zbigniew Brzezinski and Henry Kissinger, the key reason for skepticism about the United States' ability to spearhead global institutional change is not a lack of power but a lack of legitimacy. Other states may simply refuse to follow a leader whose legitimacy has been squandered under the Bush administration; in this view, the legitimacy to lead is a fixed resource that can be obtained only under special circumstances. The political scientist G.John Ikenberry argues in After Victory that states have been well positioned to reshape the institutional order only after emerging victorious from some titanic struggle, such as the French Revolution, the Napoleonic Wars, or World War I or II. For the neoconservative Robert Kagan, the legitimacy to lead came naturally to the United States during the Cold War, when it was providing the signal service of balancing the Soviet Union. The implication is that today, in the absence of such salient sources of legitimacy, the wellsprings of support for U.S. leadership have dried up for good. But this view is mistaken. For one thing, it overstates how accepted U.S. leadership was during the Cold War: anyone who recalls the Euromissile crisis of the 1980s, for example, will recognize that mass opposition to U.S. policy (in that case, over stationing intermediaterange nuclear missiles in Europe) is not a recent phenomenon. For another, it understates how dynamic and malleable legitimacy is. Legitimacy is based on the belief that an action, an actor, or a political order is proper, acceptable, or natural. An action - such as the Vietnam War or the invasion of Iraq - may come to be seen as illegitimate without sparking an irreversible crisis of legitimacy for the actor or the order. When the actor concerned has disproportionately more material resources than other states, the sources of its legitimacy can be refreshed repeatedly. After all, this is hardly the first time Americans have worried about a crisis of legitimacy. Tides of skepticism concerning U.S. leadership arguably rose as high or higher after the fall of Saigon in 1975 and during Ronald Reagan's first term, when he called the Soviet Union an "evil empire." Even George W. Bush, a globally unpopular U.S. president with deeply controversial policies, oversaw a marked improvement in relations with France, Germany, and India in recent years - even before the elections of Chancellor Angela Merkel in Germany and President Nicolas Sarkozy in France. Of course, the ability of the United States to weather such crises of legitimacy in the past hardly guarantees that it can lead the system in the future. But there are reasons for optimism. Some of the apparent damage to U.S. legitimacy might merely be the result of the Bush administration's approach to diplomacy and international institutions. Key underlying conditions remain particularly favorable for sustaining and even enhancing U.S. legitimacy in the years ahead. The United States continues to have a far larger share of the human and material resources for shaping global perceptions than any other state, as well as the unrivaled wherewithal to produce public goods that reinforce the benefits of its global role. No other state has any claim to leadership commensurate with Washington's. And largely because of the power position the United States still occupies, there is no prospect of a counterbalancing coalition emerging anytime soon to challenge it. In the end, the legitimacy of a system's leader hinges on whether the system's members see the leader as acceptable or at least preferable to realistic alternatives. Legitimacy is not necessarily about normative approval: one may dislike the United States but think its leadership is natural under the circumstances or the best that can be expected. Moreover, history provides abundant evidence that past leading states - such as Spain, France, and the United Kingdom - were able to revise the international institutions of their day without the special circumstances Ikenberry and Kagan cite. Spain fashioned both normative and positive laws to legitimize its conquest of indigenous Americans in the early seventeenth century; France instituted modern concepts of state borders to meet its needs as Europe's preeminent land power in the eighteenth century; and the United Kingdom fostered rules on piracy, neutral shipping, and colonialism to suit its interests as a developing maritime empire in the nineteenth century. As Wilhelm Grewe documents in his magisterial The Epochs of International Law, these states accomplished such feats partly through the unsubtle use of power: bribes, coercion, and the allure oflucrative long-term cooperation. Less obvious but often more important, the bargaining hands of the leading states were often strengthened by the general perception that they could pursue their interests in even less palatable ways - notably, through the naked use of force. Invariably, too, leading states have had the power to set the international agenda, indirectly affecting the development of new rules by defining the problems they were developed to address. Given its naval primacy and global trading interests, the United Kingdom was able to propel the slave trade to the forefront of the world's agenda for several decades after it had itself abolished slavery at home, in 1833. The bottom line is that the United States today has the necessary legitimacy to shepherd reform of the international system.

Private companies fill in for rearment

Michael Moodie and John P Banks 11, Michael is assistant director for foreign affairs, defense, and trade at the Congressional Research Service (CRS). He is a former assistant director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and president of a policy research center, in which capacities he focused on chemical and biological weapons issues, John is a fellow with the Energy Security Initiative at the Brookings Institution, “Expanding Industry’s Nonproliferation Role” in “Business and Nonproliferation”, googlebooks

A major theme of this volume is that in order to achieve successful nuclear nonproliferation in the decades ahead, the global nuclear industry must become a stronger partner of governments, international organizations, civil society, and other stakeholders in nonproliferation efforts. As a consequence, it is vital for industry not only to support the efforts of others (as important as that is), but also to act proactively and effectively in its own realm. In view of this requirement, the Brookings team sought industry’s general views on the current nonproliferation regime, as well as on a variety of multilateral nuclear approaches (MNAs) designed to ensure access to nuclear technologies for peaceful purposes. Equally important, the team also explored industry’s perspective on a variety of self-regulatory concepts that have been offered as ways to bolster nonproliferation governance in the nuclear sector itself. These concepts are not new. The Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) has been at the forefront of examining the application of self-regulatory approaches in the nuclear industry, as well as of assessing the lessons from other industries. The International Commission on Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament (ICNND) is also working on ideas to enhance the role of industry in proliferation prevention. The benefits of a self-regulatory approach across the nuclear industry are summarized in a recent PNNL report: Because industry is closest to users of the goods and technology that could be illicitly diverted throughout the supply chain, industry information can potentially be more timely and accurate than other sources of information. Industry is in an ideal position to help ensure that such illicit activities are detected. This role could be performed more effectively if companies joined to work together within a particular industry to promote nonproliferation by implementing an industry-wide governance/self-regulation program. Performance measures would be used to ensure their materials and technologies are secure throughout the supply chain and that customers are legitimately using and/or maintaining oversight of these items. This approach is broader than internal compliance programs (ICPs) implemented by individual companies within an industry…it includes industry-wide approaches for contributing to nonproliferation. In soliciting the nuclear industry’s response to proposed self-regulatory measures, our goal is to build on existing efforts to continue to chart a clear path forward that companies could support and implement.

Claims of proliferation resistance are false—thorium reactors produce U-233 which can be used for nukes – trust the IAEA not industry hacks.

NNL 12—National Nuclear Laboratory (UK), Comparison of thorium and uranium fuel cycles, NNL (11) 11593 Issue 5, A report prepared for and on behalf of Department of Energy and Climate Change, http://www.decc.gov.uk/assets/decc/11/meeting-energy-demand/nuclear/6300-comparison-fuel-cycles.pdf

The absence of plutonium is in the thorium fuel cycle is claimed to reduce the risk of nuclear weapons proliferation, though Reference [1] questions whether is this is completely valid, given that there were a number of U-233 nuclear tests (the “Teapot tests”) in the US in the 1950s. U-233 is in many respects very well suited for weapons use, because it has a low critical mass, a low spontaneous neutron source and low heat output. It has been stated [eg Wikipedia entry on U-233] that because U-233 has a higher spontaneous neutron source than Pu-239, then this makes it more of a technical challenge. However, this is erroneous, because even in weapons grade plutonium the main neutron source is from Pu-240. A further consideration is that the U-233 produced in thorium fuel is isotopically very pure, with only trace quantities of U-232 and U-234 produced. Although the U-232 presents problems with radiological protection during fuel fabrication, the fissile quality does not degrade with irradiation. Therefore, if it is accepted that U-233 is weapons useable, this remains the case at all burnups and there is no degradation in weapons attractiveness with burnup, unlike the U-Pu cycle.¶ The presence of trace amounts of U-232 is beneficial in that it provides a significant gamma dose field that would complicate weapons fabrication and this has been claimed to make U-233 proliferation resistant. However, there are mitigating strategies can be conceived and the U-232 dose rate cannot be regarded as a completely effective barrier to proliferation. As such, U-233 should be considered weapons usable in the same way as HEU and plutonium. This is also the position taken by the IAEA, which under the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials [16] categorises U-233 in the same way as plutonium. Under the IAEA classification, 2 kg or more of U-233 or plutonium are designated as Category I Nuclear Material and as such are subject to appropriate controls. By way of comparison, the mass of U-235 for Category I material is 5 kg. Attempts to lower the fissile content of uranium by adding U-238 are considered to offer only weak protection, as the U-233 could be separated relatively easily in a centrifuge cascade in the same way that U-235 is separated from U-238 in the standard uranium fuel cycle.¶ The overall conclusion is that while there may be some justification for the thorium fuel cycle posing a reduced proliferation risk, the justification is not very strong and, as noted in Section 3.5, this is not a major factor for utilities. Regardless of the details, those safeguards and security measures in place for the U-Pu cycle will have to remain in place for the thorium fuel cycle and there is no overall benefit.

U.S. reprocessing opens the floodgates for global prolif

UCS 11 – Union of Concerned Scientists, 4/5/11, “Nuclear Reprocessing: Dangerous, Dirty, and Expensive,” <http://www.ucsusa.org/nuclear_power/nuclear_power_risk/nuclear_proliferation_and_terrorism/nuclear-reprocessing.html>

Reprocessing would increase the ease of nuclear proliferation.

U.S. reprocessing would undermine the U.S. goal of halting the spread of fuel cycle technologies that are permitted under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty but can be used to make nuclear weapons materials. The United States cannot credibly persuade other countries to forgo a technology it has newly embraced for its own use. Although some reprocessing advocates claim that new reprocessing technologies under development will be "proliferation resistant," they would actually be more difficult for international inspectors to safeguard because it would be harder to make precise measurements of the weapon-usable materials during and after processing. Moreover, all reprocessing technologies are far more proliferation-prone than direct disposal.

Status quo solves—Obama has moved to multilateralism on Libya and beyond. The UN is back, and other nations are following the US lead!

World Outline, postgraduate student in international affairs at King’s College, 1/24/2012

[“How valuable is multilateral diplomacy in a post-9/11 world?,” http://worldoutline.wordpress.com/2012/01/24/how-valuable-is-multilateral-diplomacy-in-a-post-911-world/]

At the turn of the last century, 189 world leaders convened at the Millennium Summit and approved the Millennium Declaration which outlined eight specific goals that the United Nations was to achieve by 2015.[4] Yet, just a year later the 9/11 terrorist attacks tilted the world upon its head. The Security Council was rallied into action after the attacks and unanimously backed the United States against the threat which had caused so much devastation.[5] However, a wounded United States became increasingly relentless and unilateral in their ‘War on Terror’; when the Security Council refused to authorise a US attack upon an allegedly nuclear-armed Iraq, the United States, led by George. W. Bush, launched the assault anyway without UN approval.[6] This has been referred to as the ‘crisis of multilateralism’, as the United States undermined the very institution of which it is the biggest financial contributor and the most influential player.[7] If the founding member of the UN was refusing to follow the guidelines of the institution then why should other states follow the rules? This act set a worrying precedent for the rest of the world and, as Kofi Annan asserted, ‘undermined confidence in the possibility of collective responses to our common problems’.[8] Other instances of American unilateralism are Bush’s abstention from the Human Rights Council, his refusal to sign the Kyoto Protocol and the US departure from the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. The United States was losing sight of the benefits that multilateral diplomacy has to offer. However, the arrival of Barack Obama at the Oval Office has revived multilateral values within US foreign policy. The Obama administration has realised that it must now engage with the UN and this has marked a ‘transitional moment in the history of multilateralism’.[9] In his 2010 National Security Strategy, Obama acknowledged the fact that the US had been successful after the Second World War by pursuing their interests within multilateral forums such as the United Nations and not outside of them.[10] The global financial crisis of 2008 and the European Union’s sovereign debt crisis have demonstrated just how interdependent the economies of the western world are and these crises have created an age of austerity in which multilateralism is needed more than ever before.[11] The US has overstretched its resources and is now currently winding down two wars in Afghanistan and Iraq; they have realised that they simply do not have the means to conduct their foreign affairs exclusively anymore. Clear indications of Washington’s improved multilateral engagement with the UN since Obama’s inauguration, and the changing attitude in US foreign policy, are the economic sanctions negotiated over Iran, Obama’s decision for the US to join the Human Rights Council and, more specifically, its participation in the recent Libya mission. In Libya, the US provided support for the mission, yet played a subdued role in the campaign, allowing its European counterparts to take the lead. In contrast to his predecessor, Obama is displaying pragmatism rather than sentimentalism in his search for partners, making alliances in order to adapt to the emerging multipolar world; this is typified by Obama’s recent visit to the Asia-Pacific and his tour of South America (Brazil, Chile and El Salvador) in 2010. For the time being, US unipolarity looks to be a thing of the past; its foreign policy is changing from Bush’s unilateralism at the start of the century to a more multilateral approach at the beginning of a new decade under Obama.[12] This is the correct precedent that the most powerful nation in the world should be setting for other states to follow. The fact that the US is now engaging with the UN to counter global problems has restored the credibility that the UN had lost after the Iraq debacle and, by setting this example, other nations will follow suit and the international community as a whole can only benefit. From this change in US foreign policy, it is clear that multilateral diplomacy is of more value today than it was a decade ago.

Multilateralism fails

Harvey, 4 – University Research Professor of International Relations, professor in the Department of Political Science, and the director of the Centre for Foreign Policy Studies at Dalhousie University (Frank, Smoke And Mirrors: Globalized Terrorism And The Illusion Of Multilateral Security, p. 43-45) // MS

The typical argument favouring multilateralism is a simple one, sum- marized by Ramesh Thakur: ‘Because the world is essentially anarchi- cal, it is fundamentally insecure, characterized by strategic uncertainty and complexity because of too many actors with multiple goals and interests and variable capabilities and convictions. Collective action embedded in international institutions that mirror mainly U.S. value preferences and interests enhances predictability, reduces uncertainty, and cuts the transaction costs of intemational action.’" With respect to peacekeeping, for example, Thakur argues that if ‘the UN helps to mute the costs and spread the risks of the terms of intemational engagement to maximise these benefits, the United States will need to instill in others, as well as itself embrace, the principle of multilateralism as a norm in its own right: states must do X because the United Nations has called for X, and good states do what the United Nations asks them to do.’l2 But there are several problems with Thakur's defence of collective action and associated policy recommendations, particularly in relation to multilateral approaches to security in a post-9/11 setting. First, and foremost, state leaders often refuse to do what the UN asks of them, are often more than prepared to have their publics suffer the consequences of whatever sanctions the UN can mount, and are rarely directly affected by the sanctions that are implemented – assuming the permanent members of the Security Council find it in their collective interest to implement a sanctions regime in the first place. The lessons from UN intervention and sanction efforts over the past decade are not at all encouraging in this regard. Second, many state and non-state actors fall outside the institutional constraints imposed on the system through global norms and regimes. As the capacity spreads for smaller and smaller groups to inflict increasingly devastating levels of damage on larger states, international institutions will lose the capacity to force or coerce compliance with international law. Consequently, leaders of major powers, such as the United States, will be compelled to respond to security threats through unilateral initiatives. This compulsion will force other powers to push that much harder to control American impulses by demanding that multilateral consensus remain the sole guarantor of legitimacy. These tensions will be exacerbated by the prevailing perception in the United States that these same multilateral institutions are constraining the power and capacity of the U.S. government to protect American citizens from emerging threats of terrorism and proliferation. Third, the collective-action argument put forward by Thai-cur typically (and erroneously) assumes that most states are governed by a similar set of political priorities, share common concerns about similar combinations of security threats, are stimulated into action (or inaction) by the same set of economic imperatives, are inspired by a common set of interests and overarching values (such as peace, security, stability), and are encouraged by their respective publics to meet their demands for a common set of public goods. But the differences, tensions, and overall level of competition among states in the system are far greater than proponents of multilateralism acknowledge. Some states are more threatened by terrorism and proliferation than others, have more substantial and direct economic interest in particular regions, are less interested in securing peace, and experience pressure from their respective publics to pursue very distinct foreign and security policies. Consequently, there is no guarantee that a collection of states will have the same motivation to change the status quo, or experience the same imperative to address the same security threats with the same level of resolve, commitment, or resources (relative to their size). In sum, multi- lateral organizations are less likely today to act with the same level of urgency to address security threats that Washington considers imperative. The costs of inaction (derived from exclusive reliance on multilateral consensus) are now perceived as being higher than the costs of unilateralism. Although similar threats may have guided collective action through multilateral alliances for much of the cold war, these imperatives were a product of a common Soviet threat. But threats today are many and varied, and few states share the same concerns or face the same obligations to respond. No case more clearly illustrates the growing divisions among former allies than the 2003 Iraq war. Fourth, decreasing transaction costs may be a valid argument in favour of multilateral cooperation in some cases (e. g., to facilitate post- conflict reconstruction, political reforms, democratization, elections run by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, food aid, water distribution, and the provision of medical supplies and facilities), but this is not true for all security challenges. In a post-9/11 environment, the transaction costs that are saved through joint efforts will always be compared with the costs of depending exclusively on collective-action mechanisms that ultimately may fail - multilateralism is not free of costs or risks. For example, one of the many important lessons of the 2003 Iraq war, at least for American officials, is that there are no collective-security guarantees any longer, even from traditional allies. The UN Security Council did not function as a separate entity committed to facilitating and coordinating diplomatic exchanges towards a common good. The UN functions in a highly competitive environment in which traditional power politics plays out. Proponents of multilateralism through the UNSC do not espouse that doctrine in the interest of global security; their efforts are typically designed to use the institution to limit the capacity of the U.S. to act unilaterally to protect American interests. That level of competition, itself driven by competing interpretations of interests, values, and threats, does not lend itself well to the kind of multilateralism its proponents aspire to achieve. Of course, if France shared the same concerns about terrorism, or if leaders in Paris were equally motivated to address the potential for WMD proliferation in and through Iraq, the transaction costs incurred by responding through the UN would be more acceptable. But as threat perceptions continue to diverge, the risks associated with waiting for multilateral consensus are simply too high. The complex nature of contemporary security threats virtually guarantees that similar conflicts will plague multilateral institutions in the future.

Sustainable multilateralism is structurally impossible

Held et al, 13 – Master of University College and Professor of Politics and International Relations, at the University of Durham, and Director of Polity Press and General Editor of Global Policy (David, “Gridlock: the growing breakdown of global cooperation,” ProQuest, 5/24/2013, http://search.proquest.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/docview/1355105016) // MS

Economic and political shifts in large part attributable to the successes of the post-war multilateral order are now amongst the factors grinding that system into gridlock. The Doha round of trade negotiations is deadlocked, despite eight successful multilateral trade rounds before it. Climate negotiators have met for two decades without finding a way to stem global emissions. The UN is paralyzed in the face of growing insecurities across the world, the latest dramatic example being Syria. Each of these phenomena could be treated as if it was independent, and an explanation sought for the peculiarities of its causes. Yet, such a perspective would fail to show what they, along with numerous other instances of breakdown in international negotiations, have in common. Global cooperation is gridlocked across a range of issue areas. The reasons for this are not the result of any single underlying causal structure, but rather of several underlying dynamics that work together. Global cooperation today is failing not simply because it is very difficult to solve many global problems - indeed it is - but because previous phases of global cooperation have been incredibly successful, producing unintended consequences that have overwhelmed the problem-solving capacities of the very institutions that created them. It is hard to see how this situation can be unravelled, given failures of contemporary global leadership, the weaknesses of NGOs in converting popular campaigns into institutional change and reform, and the domestic political landscapes of the most powerful countries. A golden era of governed globalization In order to understand why gridlock has come about it is important to understand how it was that the post-Second World War era facilitated, in many respects, a successful form of 'governed globalization' that contributed to relative peace and prosperity across the world over several decades. This period was marked by peace between the great powers, although there were many proxy wars fought out in the global South. This relative stability created the conditions for what now can be regarded as an unprecedented period of prosperity that characterized the 1950s onward. Although it is by no means the sole cause, the UN is central to this story, helping to create conditions under which decolonization and successive waves of democratization could take root, profoundly altering world politics. While the economic record of the postwar years varies by country, many experienced significant economic growth and living standards rose rapidly across significant parts of the world. By the late 1980s a variety of East Asian countries were beginning to grow at an unprecedented speed, and by the late 1990s countries such as China, India and Brazil had gained significant economic momentum, a process that continues to this day. Meanwhile, the institutionalization of international cooperation proceeded at an equally impressive pace. In 1909, 37 intergovernmental organizations existed; in 2011, the number of institutions and their various off-shoots had grown to 7608 (Union of International Associations 2011). There was substantial growth in the number of international treaties in force, as well as the number of international regimes, formal and informal. At the same time, new kinds of. Postwar institutions created the conditions under which a multitude of actors could benefit from forming multinational companies, investing abroad, developing global production chains, and engaging with a plethora of other social and economic processes associated with globalization. These conditions, combined with the expansionary logic of capitalism and basic technological innovation, changed the nature of the world economy, radically increasing dependence on people and countries from every corner of the world. This interdependence, in turn, created demand for further institutionalization, which states seeking the benefits of cooperation provided, beginning the cycle anew. This is not to say that international institutions were the only cause of the dynamic form of globalization experienced over the last few decades. Changes in the nature of global capitalism, including breakthroughs in transportation and information technology, are obviously critical drivers of interdependence. However, all of these changes were allowed to thrive and develop because they took place in a relatively open, peaceful, liberal, institutionalized world order. By preventing World War Three and another Great Depression, the multilateral order arguably did just as much for interdependence as microprocessors or email (see Mueller 1990; O'Neal and Russett 1997). Beyond the special privileges of the great powers Self-reinforcing interdependence has now progressed to the point where it has altered our ability to engage in further global cooperation. That is, economic and political shifts in large part attributable to the successes of the post-war multilateral order are now amongst the factors grinding that system into gridlock. Because of the remarkable success of global cooperation in the postwar order, human interconnectedness weighs much more heavily on politics than it did in 1945. The need for international cooperation has never been higher. Yet the "supply" side of the equation, institutionalized multilateral cooperation, has stalled. In areas such as nuclear proliferation, the explosion of small arms sales, terrorism, failed states, global economic imbalances, financial market instability, global poverty and inequality, biodiversity losses, water deficits and climate change, multilateral and transnational cooperation is now increasingly ineffective or threadbare. Gridlock is not unique to one issue domain, but appears to be becoming a general feature of global governance: cooperation seems to be increasingly difficult and deficient at precisely the time when it is needed most. It is possible to identify four reasons for this blockage, four pathways to gridlock: rising multipolarity, institutional inertia, harder problems, and institutional fragmentation. Each pathway can be thought of as a growing trend that embodies a specific mix of causal mechanisms. Each of these are explained briefly below. Growing multipolarity. The absolute number of states has increased by 300 percent in the last 70 years, meaning that the most basic transaction costs of global governance have grown. More importantly, the number of states that "matter" on a given issue--that is, the states without whose cooperation a global problem cannot be adequately addressed--has expanded by similar proportions. At Bretton Woods in 1945, the rules of the world economy could essentially be written by the United States with some consultation with the UK and other European allies. In the aftermath of the 2008-2009 crisis, the G-20 has become the principal forum for global economic management, not because the established powers desired to be more inclusive, but because they could not solve the problem on their own. However, a consequence of this progress is now that many more countries, representing a diverse range of interests, must agree in order for global cooperation to occur. Institutional inertia. The postwar order succeeded, in part, because it incentivized great power involvement in key institutions. From the UN Security Council, to the Bretton Woods institutions, to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, key pillars of the global order explicitly grant special privileges to the countries that were wealthy and powerful at the time of their creation. This hierarchy was necessary to secure the participation of the most important countries in global governance. Today, the gain from this trade-off has shrunk while the costs have grown. As power shifts from West to East, North to South, a broader range of participation is needed on nearly all global issues if they are to be dealt with effectively. At the same time, following decolonization, the end of the Cold War and economic development, the idea that some countries should hold more rights and privileges than others is increasingly (and rightly) regarded as morally bankrupt. And yet, the architects of the postwar order did not, in most cases, design institutions that would organically adjust to fluctuations in national power. Harder problems. As independence has deepened, the types and scope of problems around which countries must cooperate has evolved. Problems are both now more extensive, implicating a broader range of countries and individuals within countries, and intensive, penetrating deep into the domestic policy space and daily life. Consider the example of trade. For much of the postwar era, trade negotiations focused on reducing tariff levels on manufactured products traded between industrialized countries. Now, however, negotiating a trade agreement requires also discussing a host of social, environmental, and cultural subjects - GMOs, intellectual property, health and environmental standards, biodiversity, labour standards--about which countries often disagree sharply. In the area of environmental change a similar set of considerations applies. To clean up industrial smog or address ozone depletion required fairly discrete actions from a small number of top polluters. By contrast, the threat of climate change and the efforts to mitigate it involve nearly all countries of the globe. Yet, the divergence of voice and interest within both the developed and developing worlds, along with the sheer complexity of the incentives needed to achieve a low carbon economy, have made a global deal, thus far, impossible (Falkner et al. 2011; Victor 2011). Fragmentation. The institution-builders of the 1940s began with, essentially, a blank slate. But efforts to cooperate internationally today occur in a dense institutional ecosystem shaped by path dependency. The exponential rise in both multilateral and transnational organizations has created a more complex multilevel and multi-actor system of global governance. Within this dense web of institutions mandates can conflict, interventions are frequently uncoordinated, and all too typically scarce resources are subject to intense competition. In this context, the proliferation of institutions tends to lead to dysfunctional fragmentation, reducing the ability of multilateral institutions to provide public goods. When funding and political will are scarce, countries need focal points to guide policy (Keohane and Martin 1995), which can help define the nature and form of cooperation. Yet, when international regimes overlap, these positive effects are weakened. Fragmented institutions, in turn, disaggregate resources and political will, while increasing transaction costs. In stressing four pathways to gridlock we emphasize the manner in which contemporary global governance problems build up on each other, although different pathways can carry more significance in some domains than in others. The challenges now faced by the multilateral order are substantially different from those faced by the 1945 victors in the postwar settlement. They are second-order cooperation problems arising from previous phases of success in global coordination. Together, they now block and inhibit problem solving and reform at the global level.

Be skeptical of their evidence – powerful lobbyists overblow the threat of proliferation

Kidd, 10 – Director of Strategy & Research at the World Nuclear Association [7/23, “Nuclear proliferation risk – is it vastly overrated?”, <http://www.neimagazine.com/story.asp?storyCode=2056931>, AL]

The real problem is that nuclear non-proliferation and security have powerful lobby groups behind them, largely claiming to have nothing against nuclear power as such, apart from the dangers of misuse of nuclear technology. In fact in Washington DC, home of the US federal government, there is a cottage industry of lobby groups dedicated to this. Those who oppose their scaremongering (and it essentially amounts to no more than this) are castigated as being in the industry’s pocket or acting unresponsively to allegedly genuinely expressed public fears. Pointing out that very few new countries will acquire nuclear power by even 2030, and that very few of these will likely express any interest in acquiring enrichment or reprocessing facilities, seems to go completely over their heads. In any case, nuclear fuel cycle technologies are very expensive to acquire and it makes perfect sense to buy nuclear fuel from the existing commercial international supply chain. This already guarantees security of supply, so moves towards international fuel banks are essentially irrelevant, while measures supposedly to increase the proliferation resistance of the fuel cycle are unwarranted, particularly if they impose additional costs on the industry.

Empirics disprove the cascade effect

Beljac, 4/14 – PhD from Monash University [Marko, “Have We Really Reached a Nuclear Tipping Point?”, Nuclear Resonances, <http://scisec.net/?p=338>, AL]

The image invokes what in network theory is called a global cascade. The cascade of proliferation argument is highly reliant on the spread of nuclear technology, especially fuel cycle technology such as uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing plants. This is often spoken of in the context of a global renaissance in the use of nuclear energy, especially in Asia. We currently have 9 nuclear weapon states. Since 1945 that equates to a pretty slow rate of proliferation. Furthermore, the empirical record does not really support the cascade idea. I do not believe it is possible to argue that we have 9 nuclear weapon states becauses of an interlinked cascade effect that operated between these 9 states. One might want to argue, however, that the cascade model fits in Asia. China proliferated, then India adopted a recessed deterrent then did Pakistan. In 1998 India and Pakistan went from a recessed to an overt deterrent. Nuclear weapons cascades happen, thereby, in vulnerable local clusters. China and South Asia was a vulnerable cluster. Some argue that North Korea, Japan and South Korea represents another vulnerable cluster. Thus far North Korean proliferation has not led to a localised cascade.

Nukes bestow rationality – their creation prevents aggressiveness

Waltz, 10 – Emeritus Ford Professor of Political Science at the University of California at Berkeley and senior research associate at Columbia University's Saltzman Institute of Wat and Peace Studies [Kenneth, “Is Nuclear Zero the Best Option?”, The National Interest, Sep/Oct Issue 109, p. 88, AL]

With the dawn of the nuclear age, peace has prevailed among those who have the weapons or enjoy their protection. Those who like peace should love nuclear weapons. They are the only weapons ever invented that work decisively against their own use. Those who advocate a zero option argue in effect that we should eliminate the cause of the extensive peace the nuclear world has enjoyed. India and Pakistan provide an object lesson. When they tested their warheads in May of 1998, journalists, academics and public officials predicted that war and chaos on the subcontinent would ensue. The result, as I expected, was to ensure a prolonged peace between countries that had fought three wars since independence and continued for a time to spill blood in the conflict over Kashmir. That countries with nuclear capabilities do not fight wars against one another is a lesson we should have learned. The proposition has held exactly where the prospects for war seemed the brightest, for example, between the United States and the Soviet Union, between the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China, and between India and Pakistan. New nuclear states are often greeted with dire forebodings: Is the government stable? Are the rulers sensible? The answers may be disconcerting. Yet every new nuclear nation, however bad its previous reputation, has behaved exactly like all of the old ones. The effect of having nuclear weapons overwhelms the character of the states that possess them. Countries with nuclear weapons, no matter how mean and irrational their leaders may seem to be, no matter how unstable their governments appear to be, do not launch major conventional attacks on other countries, let alone nuclear ones. Even conventional attacks can all too easily escalate out of control and lead to an exchange of nuclear warheads. With conventional weapons, countries worry about winning or losing. With nuclear weapons, countries worry about surviving or being annihilated. Nuclear weapons induce caution all around: think of the Cuban missile crisis, or think of the external behavior of China during the frightful decade of the Cultural Revolution.

Poor negotiation measures

Walter, 11 – Reader in International Relations at the London School of Economics, specializing in the political economy of international money and finance (“The Mismanagement of Global Imbalances: Why Did Multilateralism Fail?”, London School of Economics and Political Science, 12/7/2011, http://personal.lse.ac.uk/wyattwal/images/Mismanaging.pdf) // MS

Multilateralism has failed to manage global imbalances, I suggest, for two other related and deeply political reasons. First, it stemmed from a persistent unwillingness among all major countries, not just China, to accept the domestic political costs of adjustment and a related shift to different models of economic growth. I argue below that China is indeed an outlier among the G-4 (consisting of the US, EU, Japan, and China), but only because it is relatively poor, unusually open, and has opted for exchange rate targeting rather than inflation targeting. It does indeed resist external policy constraint, but in this regard it is little different to other major countries. Second, it stemmed from the weakness of the multilateral policy surveillance framework inherited from the era of western dominance. This framework was poorly suited to facilitate the negotiation of the necessary domestic and international political bargains, particularly as regards policy areas that the major countries viewed as too politically sensitive. In order for multilateralism to become more effective in the future, these flaws would need to be resolved, but there are few signs that major governments will accept the constraints on domestic policy choices that this requires.

No one signs on to multilateralism

Tanner, 2k – Deputy Director of the Geneva Centre for Security Policy (Fred, “Conflict prevention and conflict resolution: limits of multilateralism,” ICRC, 3/9/2000, http://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/misc/57jqq2.htm) // MS

The spread and global importance of internal conflicts in the 1990s, together with the increasing diversity of players in international affairs, has led to a certain multilateralization of conflict prevention efforts. This multilateralization presupposes that international and regional organizations, States and non-State entities would combine their efforts to fight the spread of deadly conflicts, in other words that all parties involved should accept a policy scheme that subscribes to a common vision on conflict resolution. But the diversity of mission mandates, the respective organizational turf, the bureaucratic red tape, national interests and conflicting views on conflict prevention and humanitarian actions set limits to effective multilateral action. Among the various players, the United Nations remains the only institution with global legitimacy for conflict prevention. Yet regional organizations have been gaining importance in security cooperation over the last few years. While this type of cooperation is invaluable, the division of labour between the UN and regional organizations has run into trouble. For example, with regard to the NATO military intervention in Kosovo, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan warned that “conflict prevention, peace-keeping and peacemaking must not become an area of competition between the United Nations and regional organizations”. [9 ] NGOs and humanitarian organizations play an integral and increasingly important role in conflict prevention, owing to their knowledge of and involvement in potential conflict areas. There is, however, an uneasy relationship between humanitarian organizations and other parties engaged in conflict prevention and peace implementation. In the final analysis, States remain the most important players in today’s international system, and if their national interests are at stake, they may tend to short-cut international organizations in favour of international contact groups or unilateral action. The following section will briefly examine each of these entities and their ability and willingness to engage in multilateral preventive action.

Multilat Doesn’t Solve War

Multilateralism fails to solve security threats

Jenkin, 6 – University of New Hampshire, citing Frank Harvey, University Research Professor of International Relations, professor in the Department of Political Science, and the director of the Centre for Foreign Policy Studies at Dalhousie University (Clinton, “Book Review: Smoke and Mirrors: Globalized Terrorism and the Illusion of Multilateral Security,” Sage Journal, Spring 2006, http://icj.sagepub.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/content/16/1/69.full.pdf+html) // MS

Smoke and Mirrors, a runner-up for the Donner Book Prize, offers a detailed examination of the nature of globalization and how it will affect and be affected by terrorism and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The author examines the nature of multilateralism and the assumption that multilateral strategies are inherently better suited to a globalized world. He uses specific cases, such as the second Iraq war, ballistic missile defense (BMD), and nonproliferation, arms control, and disarmament (NACD), to develop a cost-benefit analysis of unilateral strategies and their multilateral alternatives. Finally, the author examines the moral, economic, and political pitfalls of adopting multilateralism as an end rather than a means to an end. This book offers the reader a perspective that runs counter to the prevailing political wisdom that multilateralism is a more efficient and beneficial strategy in an era of globalization and asymmetric security threats. Smoke and Mirrors describes globalization as increasing both the probability and the seriousness of asymmetric security threats. Globalization decreases the importance of vertical proliferation (the increase in the number of weapons of mass destruction possessed by a state that already has them) and increases the threat of horizontal proliferation (the increase in the number of states who possess weapons of mass destruction). Harvey outlines the conventional political wisdom that in the era of globalization, unilateral foreign policy must and will give way to multilateral alternatives. Multilateral initiatives have a long history of failure, and unilateral initiatives should not be so easily discarded until multilateral alternatives can demonstrate some record of greater benefits achieved with fewer resources. Horizontal proliferation has led to more states (as well as nonstate actors) that are willing to defy international authority, and this environment places pressure on states to reject international cooperation or protection and instead develop a competent unilateral security policy. States that are willing and able to protect themselves will be more secure in an era of globalization than states that choose or are forced to rely on multilateral security policies. The author questions the assumption that multilateral initiatives should be the default setting for states to develop security strategies. Harvey describes a unilateral-multilateral continuum along which any foreign policy can be placed. Multilateralism is simply the result of one state’s values and goals overlapping with another’s. Trying to adjust national priorities so that they become “multilateral” simply leads to countries making decisions that are not in the best interests of its citizens. An overreliance on multilateralism can cause a state to turn its national security over to another state that is making its own unilateral choices and then forcing them on others by withholding approval of a multilateral security policy. Two states cannot develop a useful working relationship if their values and/or priorities—as applied to the context of the alliance—do not match. What defines an international alliance is give and take; if the value of what is given does not match the value of what is taken, then the alliance is not beneficial and should be abandoned. Multilateralism cannot be considered an end in and of itself; rather, it is a means to a specific context-defined end. As such, it must be open to assessment via cost-benefit analysis. Harvey uses the proposed U.S. BMD program as a case study to posit that the costs and benefits of such unilateral security programs are more advantageous than are the costs and benefits of multilateral programs designed to accomplish the same goal. Harvey offers in-depth analysis of the BMD program, both technologically and politically. He outlines the costs and benefits of a U.S. BMD program and develops counterpoints to those who criticize the program as ineffective, too expensive, or detrimental to international alliances. He offers harsh criticism of those who are quick to attack BMD as costly and destabilizing but are not willing to apply those same standards to multilateral alternatives. Harvey closely examines the main multilateral alternative to BMD, which is NACD. Harvey outlines the successes and failures of such initiatives. He concludes that the problems with BMD, though significant, are technological in nature and have a fair probability of being overcome, whereas the problems with alternative NACD security measures are qualitative in nature and have no reasonable probability of ever working at all. Harvey also develops a critique of Canadian foreign policy, whose strong multilateral emphasis offers a stark contrast to the U.S. preference for unilateral initiatives. Canada’s reliance on multilateralism as a goal rather than as a tool has led it to make a series of inconsistent and illogical foreign policy decisions. Canada has placed itself on the morally indefensible side of several international issues, and in the process, it has begun to alienate its chief allies, primarily the United States. Canada’s goal of obtaining distinction in the international community has led it into the trap of giving away more than it has received and has left its citizens worse off than if it had taken principled—though perhaps unpopular—stances on world issues. Harvey’s arguments about the moral pitfalls of multilateralism are developed from a basic point that parents and primary schoolteachers have been making for generations: A correct course of action does not require majority or even plurality assent, and an incorrect course of action does not become correct because of widespread agreement.

Multilateralism is structurally incapable of conflict prevention

Mnookind, 3 – leading expert in the field of conflict resolution (Robert, “STRATEGIC BARRIERS TO DISPUTE RESOLUTION: A COMPARISON OF BILATERAL AND MULTILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS,” Harvard Negotiation Law Review, Spring 2003, http://www.hnlr.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/04/STRATEGIC\_BARRIERS\_TO\_DISPUTE\_RESOLUTION\_A\_COMPARISON\_OF\_BILATERAL\_AND\_MULTILATE.doc) // MS

I. Introduction Why do negotiations so often fail even when there are possible resolutions that would serve disputants better than protracted struggle? And why, when resolutions are achieved, are they so often sub-optimal for the parties, or achieved only after heavy and avoidable costs? These questions have intrigued me for a number of years. Several years ago I wrote an article called Why Negotiations Fail: An Exploration of Barriers to the Resolution of Conflict1 and later, with the help of colleagues at the Stanford Center on Conflict Negotiation, I edited and wrote the introduction to a volume called Barriers To Conflict Resolutions.2 These works on barriers explored from a variety of disciplinary perspectives the strategic, psychological and institutional barriers that often led to bargaining failures. I have taken the opportunity of preparing this article to begin to think through and compare the barriers to the negotiated resolution of conflict in bilateral and multilateral negotiations. For this initial foray, I will primarily focus on what I have previously called “strategic barriers”--those that arise from the efforts of “rational” bargainers to maximize individual returns, and may preclude the achievement of the greatest possible ‘gains in trade‘ at the lowest \*2 cost. In other words, strategic barriers are those that can cause rational, self-interested disputants to act in a manner that proves to be both individually and collectively disadvantageous. I enter the multiparty world of strategic interaction with some trepidation. To begin with, the most conspicuous body of relevant theoretical scholarship is game theory, which explores issues of strategic interaction between rational, self-interested actors. While suggestive, it is also limiting. The axiomatic approach of game theoretical work on “n-person games” is mathematically daunting, has restricted descriptive power, and makes no claims at offering powerful prescriptive advice for negotiators.3 Indeed, as Anatol Rapoport pointed out over thirty years ago, game theoretical analysis of “n-person” games “directs its main thrust” to games in “characteristic function form,” which operate at a level of abstraction that does not consider the strategies available to the players.4 Nor is there very much theoretical work to build on outside of game theory. Indeed, in 1994, William Zartman claimed, ‘[c]urrently no conceptual work addresses the vast area of multilateral negotiations . . . . Implicitly or explicitly all negotiation theory addresses bi-lateral negotiations, but the complexity of multilateral negotiations remains untreated.”5 Zartman’s claim strikes me as an exaggeration. In fact, my own thinking in these matters has been substantially promoted by the important work of Howard Raiffa and James Sebenius. Twenty years ago, in his seminal book, The Art and Science of Negotiation, Howard Raiffa warned, “[t]here is a vast difference between conflicts involving two disputants and those involving more than two disputants.”6 And even Sebenius, who has in my view made the most important contributions to our knowledge of multiparty negotiation, acknowledges that “the clearest and most powerful advances in theory have been within or mainly inspired by the bi-lateral or two-party case.”7 Finally, while much of my own scholarship has been centrally concerned with negotiations and dispute resolution, nearly all of it has focused on two-party cases. Early in my academic career, I became interested in how the formal legal system acts as a backdrop for \*3 out-of-court negotiations-- what I called ‘bargaining in the shadow of the law.‘ The context in which I explored this issue was divorce, which involves bargaining between two spouses who may be represented by lawyers.8 Some years later I wrote, together with Eleanor Maccoby, a distinguished developmental psychologist, a book about how divorcing parents resolved custody issues. Dividing the Child9 is a longitudinal, empirical study that explored how some 1100 divorcing families resolved custody issues. Once again, the focus was bilateral negotiations. Similarly, my work on barriers primarily addressed, implicitly if not explicitly, bilateral negotiations. My most recent book, Beyond Winning,10 was aimed at helping lawyers and their clients negotiate both deals and disputes more effectively. With the exception of one chapter dealing with multiparty legal disputes, this book primarily analyzes legal negotiations in which two individual clients each hire an attorney, thereby creating a four-person system with lawyers in the middle. This four-person structure allows the analysis to be “simple and clear,” but the book acknowledges that “reality is rarely so kind” and that many legal disputes and deals involve not two parties, but several--consider bankruptcy proceedings, environmental disputes, or many torts cases in which a single plaintiff may sue several defendants, or multiple plaintiffs bring suit claiming that a product is defective.11 This article is organized as follows. Drawing on my previous work, Part II analyzes strategic barriers in the context of the two-party negotiations. I begin with the case of a buyer and seller simply negotiating over price-- distributive bargaining. I next turn to multi-issue two-person bargaining situations where there are value-creating possibilities. Part III represents an initial foray into the multiparty world. I suggest that the Pareto-criterion may not provide an appropriate standard to evaluate issues of efficiency in multiparty bargaining. In a two-party case, any negotiated deal presumably better serves the parties than does the status quo. The same could be said in a multiparty negotiation, but only if the consent of every party \*4 were necessary. A requirement of unanimity in multilateral negotiation, however, creates potential holdout problems that may pose severe strategic barriers to resolution. These problems can be mitigated if the consent of less than all the parties can permit action. But other problems may arise. If coalitions of less than all are able to change the status quo, this necessarily means that a party left out of a coalition may potentially be made worse off. A variety of procedural rules may permit decision-making without unanimity in multiparty negotiations. Majority voting is but one of many possible mechanisms to allocate decision-making authority. The outcome of any multilateral negotiation can be profoundly affected by these procedural rules and various decisions concerning agenda. Part IV briefly explores the application of an unusual procedural rule--the “sufficient consensus” standard--that was employed in the multiparty “constitutional” negotiations in South Africa and in Northern Ireland. II. Strategic Barriers in Two-Party Negotiations Beyond Winning suggests that negotiation requires the management of three tensions inherent in negotiation: the tension between creating and distributing value; the tension between empathy and assertiveness; and the tension between principals and agents.12 In two-party negotiations, the primary strategic barrier relates to the first tension between the desire for distributive gain--getting a bigger slice of the pie--and the opportunity for joint gains--finding ways to make the pie bigger. Understanding this tension, which also exists in multilateral negotiations, is a necessary foundation for all that follows. I begin with the case where there are no value-creating opportunities at all--a case of purely distributive bargaining between two parties negotiating over a fixed pie. I then move on to two-party negotiations involving multiple issues where there are value-creating opportunities. A. Distributive Bargaining: Two Parties, One Issue Our analysis of strategic barriers begins with a bilateral negotiation that essentially involves distributing value. Assume two individuals--Buyer and Seller--must negotiate the price of a used automobile. To simplify the matter, let us assume these parties are concerned about only this deal, and that there are no linkages to similar problems or issues of repetitive play. \*5 Negotiation analysis suggests that each party needs to determine his BATNA (“Best Alternative To a Negotiated Agreement”).13 The BATNA indicates what that negotiator can do away from the table if no deal is reached. The BATNA must be translated into a reservation value--the amount at which the bargainer is indifferent between reaching a deal and walking away to his BATNA. In our example, I will assume that Seller’s BATNA is to sell his car to a dealer, who has offered him $7,000. I will assume that this is Seller’s reservation value as well. Let us assume that Buyer’s BATNA is to buy a somewhat newer, used car from a dealer with slightly lower mileage for $11,500. Buyer translates this into a reservation value of $9,000 for the car that Seller is offering. On these facts the ZOPA (“Zone Of Possible Agreement”)--the bargaining range created by the two reservation values--lies between $7,000 and $9,000. At stake in this negotiation is how the surplus of $2,000 will be divided. Both Buyer and Seller are made better off by any transaction with a price anywhere in the bargaining range. As such, any deal within the ZOPA is Pareto-superior to no deal at all. A sale for any price between $7,000 and $9,000 is Pareto-efficient, and other things being equal, Buyer would obviously prefer to pay less and Seller would prefer to receive more. Note that this is not a zero-sum game because both players would prefer to negotiate a deal within the ZOPA than to have no deal at all. “[W]hen bargaining, buyer and seller may have divergent interests with respect to price, but both may prefer to reach some agreement.”14 The desire for distributive gain may lead to a bargaining failure in which the parties do not reach a deal, notwithstanding the ZOPA, because each is seeking to maximize his own return. Two factors help explain this possibility: information asymmetries and strategic behavior. In most negotiations, each party has at least some material information that the other party does not have. One potential information asymmetry is the condition or the quality of the goods to be traded. The seller typically knows far more about the quality of what is being sold than the buyer. It is well established that information \*6 asymmetries about quality, the “lemons problem,” can also lead to non-Pareto outcomes.15 The more common asymmetry concerns reservation values. Buyers and sellers usually do not know each other’s “bottom line.” Buyer, for example, may know neither the amount a dealer would pay for the car, nor how eager Seller is to get rid of it. Seller may not know Buyer’s alternatives or how badly Buyer wants this particular car. Negotiators rarely reveal honestly their reservation value. Information asymmetries of this sort open opportunities for strategic opportunism. Indeed, the essence of distributive bargaining involves the attempt on the part of negotiators to shape each other’s perceptions of what is possible. When deciding what action to take, each player must consider the other’s possible reaction, and vice versa. This is the essence of strategic interdependence. Each negotiator is constantly assessing what the other side might eventually be willing to do and how far they might go. Negotiators employ a variety of tactics to influence the other side’s perceptions of what is possible--some misleading, some outright dishonest. As a consequence, the parties might never discover that there is a ZOPA because, aspiring to drive a hard bargain, each might make extreme offers from which he recedes very slowly. Typically, neither negotiator knows how far it might be possible to push the other side. As a consequence, the drive for distributive advantage may at times be a barrier to a deal being made or a dispute being settled. Even if a sale is consummated (or the lawsuit settled), the transaction costs of reaching agreement might be much higher than necessary. What if Buyer and Seller somehow know each other’s reservation value? In this case, an obvious focal point for a deal would be to divide the surplus in half. While splitting the surplus may be a common result where there is full information, strategic opportunism and the drive for distributive gain can lead to negotiation failures. Even if the parties know (or can guess) each other’s reservation price, there still can be no deal if they disagree about how the surplus should be divided. Each might attempt to shape each other’s perceptions of how firmly they will insist on a particular share of a known surplus. One or both might try to persuade the other that he is committed to walking away from a beneficial deal rather than accept less than the lion’s share of the surplus. Using a variety of “commitment \*7 strategies,” a party can make a “take-it-or-leave-it offer” that would give that party the lion’s share of the surplus.16 Seller might go so far, for example, as to give a power of attorney to an agent to sell only at a high price and then leave town to make that claim credible. Two might play that game and a deadlock could result: Players in a bargaining game are in an awkward position. They want to make the most favorable agreement that they can, while avoiding the risk of making no agreement at all; and, to certain extent, these goals are contradictory. If one party indicates a willingness to settle for any terms, even if the gain is only marginal, he or she will likely arrive at an agreement, but not a very attractive one. On the other hand, if he takes a hard position and sticks to it, he is likely to reach a favorable agreement if he reaches any agreement at all--but he stands a good chance of being left out in the cold.17 In sum, hard-bargaining tactics that may be rational for self-interested parties concerned with maximizing the size of their own slice of the pie can sometimes lead to inefficient outcomes. Those subjected to such tactics often respond in kind, and the net result is, at best, additional costs of the dispute resolution process and, at worst, failure to consummate a mutually beneficial agreement. B. An Aside on the Limits of Game Theoretical Analysis of Bargaining Our car example generalizes to a very common type of economic transaction, one that economists have characterized as a bargaining game. The buyer would prefer to pay less; the seller would prefer to \*8 receive more; but both would prefer any deal within a zone created by the their no-deal alternatives to no resolution at all. According to one very prominent game theorist, however, ‘bargaining is an extremely difficult topic because in many settings it runs right up against the things game theory is not so good at.‘18 It is helpful to explain what these limitations are. First, because game theory is a branch of mathematics, it requires the definition of very precise protocols or rules of the game. In our example, and in most real world bargaining situations, there are no rules set out in advance specifying who must make the first offer, whether offers can be made simultaneously, how many rounds of bargaining are permitted, or when the negotiation ends. Indeed, game theoretical analysis shows just how sensitive the outcome of any bargaining game is to various protocols. Consider the following very simple bargaining game with the following protocol. Only one round of bargaining is permitted. Both parties know each other’s reservation value. One player gets to make a single take-it-or-leave-it offer. If the other player accepts, the transaction is consummated at this price. If not, the game ends and each player receives his no-deal alternative. If the protocol specifies the buyer gets to make the single take-it-or-leave-it offer, we would expect the buyer to capture almost the entire surplus by offering only a tiny amount above $7,000. Under the protocol, since the seller would be better off accepting this price than selling to a dealer, the buyer would get a very good deal. On the other hand, if the protocol provided that the seller could make a take-it-or-leave-it offer, the seller might establish a price of nearly $9,000 and the seller would essentially capture the entire surplus. Negotiation over price in the real world typically does not involve such simple and well-defined procedures that are agreed upon in advance. Instead, players can usually make so many possible moves and counter-moves that the “game” is much too rich for game theoretic techniques, which “require clear and distinct ‘rules of the game.”’19 This is not to say that game theory provides no useful insights into bargaining. On the contrary, non-cooperative game theory permits modeling and analysis of how different sorts of rules of the game affect strategic interaction between rational actors. A second common problem of game theoretic analysis is that there are often many equilibria and no way to choose among them. \*9 This problem can also be illustrated with a simple one-round bargaining model with one round in which the buyer and seller simultaneously name a price without any prior knowledge of the amount specified by the other side. The rules of the game or protocol further provide that if the offers match, the car is sold at that price; if the buyer’s price is higher than the seller’s price, the transaction will occur at the average of the two prices; and if the seller’s price is higher than the buyer’s price, there will be no deal. In this game, any price between $7,000 and $9,000 represents a Nash Equilibrium if named by both parties. If the named prices are the same, neither player has any incentive to change his price. To see this, assume both players named $7,250. If the seller knew this, he would lose the sale with a higher price and receive less with a lower named price. Analogously, the buyer would lose the transaction with a lower price, and would pay more with a higher named price. In short, once each named $7,250, neither would have any incentive to change the named amount. The paradox is that this same reasoning applies to any price in the bargaining range if named by both players. Game theory “is of no help in sorting out whether any one [of these Nash equilibria] is the ‘solution’ and, if one is, which one is.”20 Indeed, as David Kreps has emphasized, “simultaneous-offer bargaining is only one context where there is this problem of too many equilibria and too little guidance for choosing among them.”21 To escape the problem of multiple equilibriums, John Nash approached the bargaining problem in an axiomatic way--i.e., he set out a series of characteristics that any solution should have. Based on these axioms he suggested an “Arbitration Scheme” in which parties would agree to have an arbitrator divide the surplus in a way that maximized the product of the player’s utilities, taking the threat points (the BATNA’s) into account.22 Needless to say, it is not clear how an arbitrator could expect to learn the players’ respective utilities, nor why parties to a negotiation would decide to leave their fate to an arbitrator. Ariel Rubinstein brilliantly modeled alternating-offer bargaining in a way that produced a single equilibrium.23 His game works as follows. There are two players and each can make one offer at a time. \*10 Player B has a choice of either accepting player A’s offer or responding with an offer of his own. A key element of this game is that the surplus that the players are dividing diminishes over time and each player has a discount rate. The outcome of this game is that the first player on the first round offers a tiny bit more than 50% and the second player agrees immediately. The Rubinstein result holds if instead of using discount rates, each party bears transaction costs each time he makes an offer. A nice feature of this model is that if the players have the same time preferences or the same transaction costs, they will essentially divide the surplus evenly--an outcome that matches our intuition. On the other hand, if there are substantial differences, it can have very dramatic effects on the equilibrium--effects with much less intuitive appeal.24 More fundamentally, the extension of the Rubinstein model to three or more players no longer has a single, unique equilibrium.25 A third limitation of game theoretical analysis should also be emphasized. Game theory provides no theory about where the rules of the game come from. In particular, as I will develop in the next section, because an important element of negotiation often involves changing the game, by adding parties, by adding issues, or by strategically changing procedures, formal game theoretical analysis cannot help us understand why a party changes the rules or players or issues when he did. Indeed, an important part of many multiparty negotiations concerns negotiating the rules and procedures. As a final point, I would like to suggest that game theory is not especially powerful either as a descriptive theory (predicting how people actually behave) or as a prescriptive theory (suggesting how rational people should best negotiate in a world where many people do not behave in ways consistent with the theory). These points are best illustrated by considering the vast experimental literature relating to the “ultimatum game,” the structure of which is akin to the sequential one-round bargaining game described above. These experiments suggest that, economic theory notwithstanding, a party with full information will often refuse to accept a final offer within the ZOPA if the resulting division of the surplus offends his sense of fairness. \*11 In the ‘ultimatum game‘ one player is given the right to divide a fixed sum of money, say $10, and then give an ultimatum to the second player: either accept the share offered, in which case the $10 is divided according to the offer, or reject the division, in which case neither player receives anything. This is a purely distributive game, where a surplus of $10 is being divided into two known shares set by the first player. Game theory suggests that a rational offeree would prefer a pittance--say a penny--to receiving nothing, even if the offeror is getting $9.99. In other words, the offeree’s reservation value should be “epsilon”--a small amount greater than zero. And yet the evidence suggests that when the first player divides the surplus in a very one-sided way, many offerees will reject the offer and take nothing in order to deprive the offeror of the lion’s share. Where there is full information and the issue of distribution looms large, a party’s sense of fairness can lead to what economists would call Pareto-inefficient outcomes. In short, as a descriptive matter, the game theoretical model of this simple game does not capture the behavior of many individuals.26 If this is so, there are important implications for prescriptive theory, or what Howard Raiffa suggests is the appropriate “descriptive-prescriptive” stance of someone giving advice to real world negotiators. Raiffa suggests that a good prescriptive theory should be based on how one believes the negotiating counterpart actually behaves. The best prescriptive advice to someone who gets to divide the pie in the ultimatum game is that he will probably maximize his return by dividing the $10 to offer the other side something in the $4 range--far more than a penny. While some may turn down anything other than an even split, most will accept an uneven split so long as its not too extreme.27 C. Two Parties, Several Issues: The Tension Between Creating and Distributing Value Most negotiations involve more than dividing a fixed pie--they also offer opportunities for creating value and thereby expanding the pie. What do I mean by creating value? I think it is best defined in terms of Pareto-efficiency. An outcome is said to be Pareto-efficient or Pareto-optimal if one party can be made better off only by making \*12 the other party worse off. Economics teaches that there is a Pareto frontier consisting of various Pareto-optimal outcomes that have different distributive consequences for the parties.28 By definition, whenever there is a negotiated agreement in a two-party negotiation both parties must believe that a negotiated outcome leaves them at least as well off as they would have been if there were no agreement. Therefore, in a fixed, positive sum game, any resolution is Pareto-efficient in comparison to no deal at all. On the other hand, in negotiations where it is possible to create value, parties may reach negotiated outcomes that are not Pareto-efficient if there is some other negotiated outcome available that might make one party better off without harming the other. This notion of creating value builds on a long-established tradition that negotiation literature refers to as the ‘integrative‘ possibilities present in some negotiations.29 Before describing why strategic interaction may prevent negotiators from reaching resolutions that are Pareto-efficient, one should first understand the sources of value and their economic underpinnings. In my view, there are four sources of value through negotiation: differences between the parties; non-competitive similarities; economies of scale and scope; and opportunities for reducing transaction costs and dampening economic opportunism. The notion that differences can create value is counterintuitive to many negotiators, who believe they can reach agreement only by finding common ground. But the truth is that differences are often more useful than similarities in helping parties reach a deal. Differences set the stage for possible gains through trade, and it is through trade that value is most commonly created. There are five types of differences that are all potential sources of value creation: different resources; different relative valuations; different forecasts; different risk preferences; and different time preferences. Through the negotiation process, to the extent that parties discover that such differences exist, they can structure transactions that create value by trading on what amounts to differences in relative valuation. \*13 A second source of value is non-competitive similarities. In these instances, one person’s gain does not mean the other person’s loss. For example, negotiators often have a shared interest in a productive, cordial working relationship. Both gain to the extent that they can improve their relationship. Likewise, parents share an interest in the well-being of their children. If a child flourishes, both parents derive satisfaction. Thus, even for divorcing parents, arrangements that benefit a child create joint gains for both adults. A third source of value relates to economies of scale and scope. Two firms that each have a small plant may be able to reduce the unit cost of production by having a joint venture that builds one large production facility. Creating or preserving scale economies is a rich source of value creation. Similarly, economies of scope can also create value. These arise when more than one good or service can be produced using the same basic resources, thus reducing the costs of each. Negotiators can also create value by reducing the transaction costs of reaching an agreement and by dampening strategic opportunism. This can occur in several ways: by making the process of negotiation less time-consuming and costly; by reducing the risks that the parties will deceive each other; and by better aligning future incentives. What, then, is the tension between creating and distributing value in a negotiation? It is a tension that, if managed badly, will lead to outcomes that fail to fully exploit the value creating possibilities. Information drives this tension. Without sharing information, negotiators find it difficult to identify trades that might create value and potentially make both parties better off. Unreciprocated openness, however, can be exploited. Disclosing one’s preferences, resources, interests, and alternatives can help to create value, but can pose a grave risk with respect to distributive issues. Negotiators are constantly caught between these competing strategic demands. In the end, an individual negotiator is typically concerned first with the size of her slice and only secondarily with the size of the pie as a whole. Indeed, a negotiator who can easily claim a large share of a small pie may wind up with more to eat than one who bakes a much bigger pie but ends up with only a sliver. A skillful negotiator moves nimbly between imaginative strategies to enlarge the pie and conservative strategies to secure an ample slice no matter what size the final pie turns out to be. Difficulties arise, however, because many negotiators do not manage this tension well and, as a consequence of \*14 focusing primarily on the distributive dimension of bargaining, fail to seize value-creating opportunities. In short, accurate information about each negotiator’s goals, priorities, preferences, resources, and opportunities is essential to reach agreements that offer optimal ‘gain from trade‘--agreements tailored to take full advantage of the sources of value outlined above. At the same time, however, parties have a clear incentive to conceal their interests and priorities, or even mislead the other side about them. By feigning attachment to whatever resources they are ready to give up in trade and feigning relative indifference to whatever resources they seek to gain while concealing opportunities for utilization of these resources, each party seeks to win the best possible terms of trade for itself. In other words, total frankness and ‘full disclosure‘--or simply greater frankness and fuller disclosure than practiced by the other side of the negotiation--leave one side vulnerable in the distributive aspect of bargaining. Accordingly, the sharp bargainer is tempted, and may rationally deem it advantageous, to practice secrecy and deception. Once again, however, these tactics can lead to unnecessary deadlocks and costly delays or, more fundamentally, failures to discover the most efficient trades or outcomes.30 \* \* \* \* This short summary suggests the underlying reasons that strategic interaction--the self-conscious rational behavior of individual negotiators-- may act as a barrier to Pareto-efficient outcomes. In simple negotiations that only implicate distributive issues, the result may be no agreement under circumstances where both parties could be made better off by one or more possible agreements. Where a negotiation involves several dimensions, there are often integrative possibilities--opportunities to make the pie bigger. Here, the problem can be two-fold. In some instances, the focus on distributive gain may result in no deal or resolution at all. More commonly, it may lead to a negotiated outcome that is not Pareto-optimal. III. Multiparty Negotiations My analysis of bilateral negotiations explains why a negotiator’s pursuit of distributive gain can often lead to negotiation failures. Even though there are possible agreements that would better serve the parties, agreement may not be reached at all, or even if resolution \*15 is achieved, may not satisfy the economist’s Pareto-criterion of efficiency. These same strategic problems--and the underlying tension between creating and claiming value--exist in multiparty negotiations as well. But in this section, I would like to explore several additional strategic complications that may act as barriers in the multiparty context alone. The first problem concerns the meaning of creating value and efficiency in the multiparty context. Like other negotiation analysts, in bilateral negotiations I define creating value in terms of Pareto-efficiency. This measure does not require inter-personal utility comparisons. It simply suggests that efficiency is improved whenever there is an alternative resolution that either makes both parties better off or makes one party better off when the other party is no worse off. An important feature of bilateral negotiation is that whenever the parties have agreed to an outcome, that outcome can be presumed to better serve the interests of each party than the status quo--otherwise there would have been no agreement. Measuring value is much less straightforward in a multiparty context. Paradoxically, the requirement of Pareto-efficiency may be very inefficient. The Pareto-criterion requires that every party to a negotiation have veto power over the deal. If there are ten parties to a negotiation, the only way we can know that a negotiated agreement is Pareto-superior to the status quo is if all ten parties agree to make the deal. In other words, Pareto-efficiency in a multiparty negotiation requires unanimity. Unfortunately, a unanimity rule creates the strategic risk of holdout problems. Assume, for the moment, that the ZOPA in a multiparty context includes many possible deals with different distributive implications, all of which make all ten negotiators better off than the status quo. With a unanimity rule, the distributive aspects of multiparty bargaining can become extremely difficult and time consuming to manage. Whenever nine out of ten negotiators have agreed to a particular deal, the tenth person may credibly threaten to veto that deal because he wants a deal that gives him a larger share of the pie. Obviously more than one negotiator can play this game, and as a consequence, the transaction costs of attempting to achieve unanimous agreement can be very high and negotiations can break down. A few years back, I saw an example of this. A Cambridge, Massachusetts neighborhood was given the opportunity to have its electrical wires put underground. The city would provide a partial subsidy, but the ten neighbors all had to consent to an allocation of \*16 the remaining costs for installing the new main wire. Whatever the allocation, each neighbor would also need to pay his own hook-up costs for bringing the power from the new underground wire to his house. Most neighbors quickly agreed to allocate the cost of the main wire based on frontage feet of each lot. But one neighbor, “Mr. Jones,” whose house was set farther back from the street, objected. He argued that since his connection cost to a new underground wire would be higher, he should pay a smaller share of the joint costs. Two other neighbors saw Jones’ suggestion as strategic--as holding out to get more of the surplus-- and as a consequence, no deal could be made at all: the electrical wires were not placed underground and the subsidy was lost. My own intuition is that the probability of a bargaining failure, even though there is a ZOPA, will increase as the number of the parties to a negotiation goes up, if each has a veto. And even if a deal is made, I would also predict that the transaction costs of reaching agreement are likely to be much higher than with a less strict decision rule. Putting the holdout issue aside, there is an even more fundamental issue. As parties are added, if each has a veto, it would stand to reason that the risk of there being no ZOPA increases. This is not a problem if one believes a negotiated deal should not be possible if it has even slightly unfavorable distributional consequences for even one party. But in the multiparty context, there often may be situations where the gains for the winners from a social perspective are thought to substantially outweigh the losses of the losers. What if a possible agreement benefits nearly all of the parties a great deal, but imposes slight losses on a few? Because the Pareto-criterion imposes a distribution requirement that privileges the status quo, the losers might be expected to exercise their veto. And yet in many contexts, especially if side-payments are not possible, one might conclude that at least in terms of wealth maximization and ordinary notions of efficiency, the community would be better off with the deal even though it does not meet the requirements of Pareto-efficiency. Interestingly, using the ‘Kaldor-Hicks‘ compensation criterion as a way of defining economic efficiency avoids the constraints of the classical Pareto-criterion. Kaldor-Hicks asks whether it is possible for the winners to make side payments to the losers so that the losers would be indifferent between the new arrangement and the status quo. No such side payment is actually required to be paid, however. If, as a theoretical proposition, the gains are sufficient to permit such payments, that is enough to conclude that the proposed arrangement \*17 is more efficient that the status quo. In Kaldor’s words, whether the losers “should be given compensation . . . is a political question on which an economist could hardly pronounce an opinion.”31 Because the Kaldor-Hicks test asks whether it might be possible to make a compensatory payment, not whether in fact one is going to be made, it mitigates the holdout problem. Some parties might be made worse off, but the new arrangement would nonetheless be viewed as more efficient than the old status quo. But Kaldor-Hicks is hardly a complete solution to determining economic efficiency in a multiparty negotiation. As a matter of economic theory, the criterion is not without its problems, whether because of potential changes in relative prices or income effects.32 While applied economists and policy makers may use cost-benefit analysis or “wealth maximization” principles to evaluate economic efficiency, they are implicitly making “a leap of faith,” and “weigh[ing] together Eve’s losses and Adam’s gains.”33 More fundamentally, in a negotiation, no social planner is trying to weigh overall costs and benefits to assess whether a sufficient side-payment is theoretically possible. If less than all can impose costs on a minority without the need to make side-payments, how can we be confident that the new arrangement improves social welfare in comparison with the status quo? Notwithstanding these conceptual difficulties, in many contexts unanimity requirements are simply bypassed because subgroups can form coalitions and make their own agreements, unconstrained by a veto of those who might be disadvantaged. “Once three or more conflicting parties are involved, coalitions may form and act in concert against the other disputants.”34 Those left out of a coalition may often be worse off than they were before negotiations began. Unlike in bilateral negotiations, where typically one party cannot affect the other party’s BATNA, in multiparty negotiations, those left out of deal may often find themselves worse off if no deal were made. Consider, for example, merger negotiations in an industry with three competing companies. Although a “grand coalition” involving a merger of all three parties might be possible, so too would be mergers \*18 between any two of the firms. Moreover, a merger between any two firms might make the company left out worse off than if no deal were made.35 Whenever coordinated actions or decisions by less than all the parties can change the status quo, the potential for coalitional dynamics becomes part and parcel of multiparty negotiation. Without attempting to plumb fully the conceptual complexities of coalitions, it is safe to assert that a variety of strategic barriers can arise that do not exist in bilateral negotiations. N-person game theory demonstrates, for example, that with respect to games that have no “core,” the problem is not too many equilibriums, but none. “If a game has no core, it is unstable in the sense that whatever the payoff, some coalition has the power and motivation to break up the imputation and go off on its own.”36 Coalitional instability may lead to an obvious strategic barrier in such instances. IV. Decision-Making Procedures in Multiparty Negotiation: The Example of “Sufficient Consensus” Multilateral negotiations often take place within institutions that have created procedural rules allowing less than all the parties to change the status quo, notwithstanding the objections of some.37 An interesting question is how such procedures might be used to mitigate the holdout problem and allow a negotiated resolution that is widely accepted as legitimate. Recent examples of complex multiparty political negotiations took place in South Africa and Northern Ireland. In South Africa, the goals of the negotiations were to create an interim constitution, dismantle apartheid, and prepare for the country’s first open elections. In Northern Ireland, the goal was to create a framework for self-government.

There is no trust or international acceptance

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Theoretical debates about multilateralism positively juxtapose it to unilateralism or bilateralism, because it is seen as a natural ideational fit with the growth of global governance. The major schism on the concept is between normativists who emphasise shared values and the realists’ concerns with strategic interactions and power asymmetries. The Kosovo crisis beginning in 1999 could be seen as the first major crisis of multilateralism in the international system after the end of the Cold War. It was a crisis about the role and interests of a hegemonic USA and a weakened Russia. As a case, Kosovo demonstrates the paradoxes and limitations of multilateralism in the field of international security, when there are different types and levels of multilateralism interacting. The US and EU leaderships saw Kosovo as essentially a regional problem which could be manipulated to rejuvenate and enhance Western multilateral cooperation in NATO. This view found support among an upper echelon of officials in the UN, surrounding Secretary-General Kofi Annan, which favoured a multilateral intervention in Kosovo as proof of commitment to the developing norm of ‘right to protect’. Russia, however, saw its multilateral engagement over Kosovo as a strategic interaction to counterbalance and compensate for its weakness vis-a`-vis NATO. The multilateral interactions by these three parties appear to have deepened mistrust as the process failed to resolve the final status of Kosovo, leading to its unilateral declaration of independence in 2008. The case demonstrates the importance of shared interests for successful multilateral interactions. STUDIES OF MULTILATERALISM PROLIFERATED IN THE 1990s in the aftermath of the fall of communism and the major changes in power in the international system that accompanied the collapse of the USSR. Theoretical debates about multilateralism evolved from concerns with the numbers and natures of negotiating parties to social constructs such as ideas about shared rules and norms of cooperation, notably reciprocity and legitimacy. As a concept, multilateralism was seen as under-theorised in the 1990s but since then it has developed into a set of broader normative values around the notions of interdependence and global governance in a multiplicity of policy fields, from global and regional trade agreements, debt, poverty, climate change and other environmental concerns, to health and security challenges (Caporaso 1992; Ruggie 1992; Cox 1992, 1997; Diehl 1997). As a concept it is consistently positively juxtaposed to unilateralism or bilateralism, because it is seen as a natural ideational fit with the growth of international institutions and other structures and processes post-World War II, whereas the latter are seen as reflecting the anarchic and destabilising world order which led to that conflagration.